United Nations S/2012/545

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 July 2012

Original: English

Letter dated 11 July 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with paragraph 6 (m) of Security Council resolution 2002 (2011), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report focusing on Eritrea of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea.

In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter, together with its enclosure, were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) H. S. **Puri**
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant to
resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)
concerning Somalia and Eritrea

12-38313 (E) 200712

Please recycle

Letter dated 27 June 2012 from the members of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea

In accordance with paragraph 6 (m) of Security Council resolution 2002 (2011), we have the honour to transmit herewith the report focusing on Eritrea of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea.

(*Signed*) Matt **Bryden**
Coordinator
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea

(*Signed*) Emmanuel **Deisser**
Arms expert

(*Signed*) Aurélien **Llorca**
Aviation expert

(*Signed*) Jörg **Roofthooft**
Maritime expert

(*Signed*) Ghassan **Schbley**
Finance expert

(*Signed*) Babatunde **Taiwo**
Armed groups expert

(*Signed*) Kristele **Younes**
Humanitarian expert

Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011)

Contents

		Page
	Summary	5
I.	Introduction	7
	A. Mandate	7
	B. Methodology	7
II.	Regional context	8
III.	Support for armed groups in the region	9
	A. Somalia	10
	B. Ethiopia	11
IV.	Violations of the general and complete arms embargo	16
	A. Eritrean air force	16
	B. Trafficking in arms and people	20
V.	Revenue collection outside Eritrea	21
VI.	Revenues from the mining sector and due diligence	25
VII.	Acts that obstruct the implementation of resolution 1862 (2009):	28
VIII.	Recommendations	30
Annexes*		
	Eritrea	
1.	Support for armed groups in the region	31
	1.1. Support for the Ogaden National Liberation Front and Oromo Liberation Front	31
	1.1.a. Aerial view of Kiloma training camp and adjacent airstrip (17 April 2006)	36
	1.1.b. Aerial view of Harena training camp (17 November 2006)	37
	1.1.c. Aerial view of Sawa training camp and military base (11 February 2006)	38
2.	Violations of the general and complete arms embargo	39
	2.1. Aerial view of the military apron of Asmara airport	39
	2.2. Trafficking of arms and people — testimonies	42
3.	Revenue collection outside Eritrea	53
	3.1. Eritrean extraterritorial revenue collection	53
	3.1.a. Power of attorney form and certified translation	59

* The annexes are being issued without formal editing in the language of submission only.

3.1.b. Immigration and Citizenship Services request form 62
3.1.c. Two per cent form with defence contribution 65
3.1.d. Tax and duties payment receipt 68
4. Acts that obstruct the implementation of resolution 1862 (2009) 70
4.1. Escape from Eritrea of Djiboutian prisoners of war 70
4.1.a. Information files of escaped Djiboutian prisoners of war 73
4.1.b. Information files of Djiboutian military personnel missing in action 75
4.1.c. Aerial view of suspected Assab holding facilities (23 December 2007) 80
4.1.d. Aerial view of Shabay-Mandar training camp and adjacent prison facility (17 March 2007) 82

Summary

Since the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1907 (2009) more than two years ago, the Eritrean authorities appear to have been responding to international pressure to curb the involvement of Eritrea in activities that threaten international peace and security, notably support for the Somali extremist group, Harakaat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin, commonly known as Al-Shabaab. However, in most other respects, Eritrea has failed to comply with Security Council resolutions and remains a destabilizing influence throughout much of the region.

The Monitoring Group has found no evidence to support allegations of direct Eritrean support to Al-Shabaab during the course of its present mandate. This is in part a symptom of growing friction between the authorities in Asmara and Al-Shabaab's leadership, and in part a reflection of Al-Shabaab's declining fortunes on the battlefield: since August 2011, the militant group has steadily ceded ground in the face of military offensives by African Union, Kenyan and Ethiopian forces, together with their Somali allies. But it is also a result of enhanced international scrutiny, which has made direct support to Somali armed opposition groups a much riskier undertaking than in the past.

Nevertheless, the Monitoring Group has confirmed that Eritrea continues to violate resolutions 1844 (2008) and 1907 (2009) by deploying Ethiopian armed opposition groups via Somali territory. In October 2011, a combined group of fighters from the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was intercepted in central Somalia, en route to Ethiopia, by local Somali militia. Both groups had been hosted and trained in Eritrea prior to their deployment, and their senior leaders remain based in Asmara. Moreover, the Somali facilitators engaged to assist their movement and provide them with weapons have long been employed by Eritrea and ONLF for this purpose, and are known to provide weapons and other support to Al-Shabaab.

Eritrea's support for Ethiopian armed opposition groups, though not new, occurs in a climate of growing tension between the two countries. In March 2011, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was quoted in international media as stating that Ethiopia would work in a diplomatic and military capacity to oust the Government in Asmara. In January 2012, members of the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF) attacked a group of European tourists in eastern Ethiopia. Although the Monitoring Group has found no evidence of direct Eritrean involvement in the operation, it has confirmed that ARDUF fighters were hosted and trained in Eritrea as recently as December 2011, and that some of those responsible for the killings had recently been based at a training camp near Assab, Eritrea.

The general and complete arms embargo on Eritrea has had an adverse effect on the operational readiness of the Eritrean air force. The Monitoring Group estimates that only between one quarter and one third of air force aircraft are fully operational, because of lack of access to the spare parts and technical assistance required to meet maintenance standards. Nevertheless, it is the assessment of the Group that even the current reduced state of readiness of the Eritrean air force is indicative of ongoing imports of spare parts and external assistance, in violation of the arms embargo. The Group has not yet been able to assess the impact of the embargo on other elements of the Eritrean armed forces.

The Eritrean authorities also continue to violate the arms embargo through the smuggling of weapons and ammunition for commercial sale through Sudan. This clandestine exercise is supervised by senior military officials, including General Tekle Kifle "Manjus", who receive at least $3.6 million per year in proceeds. This goes hand-in-glove with another, much more lucrative activity: human trafficking to Sudan and the Sinai. The same criminal networks smuggle Eritrean migrants and Eritrean weapons, often in the same vehicles. Once in the Sudan or the Sinai, Eritrean migrants are routinely taken hostage, tortured, raped or killed, while their kidnappers demand an average of $30,000 to $40,000 ransom — often negotiated and paid through Eritrean mediators.

The Eritrean authorities continue to rely heavily on extraterritorial taxation among Eritrean diaspora communities to generate hard currency. The Monitoring Group has confirmed that the collection of such taxes routinely involves threats, harassment and intimidation against the individual concerned or relatives in Eritrea. Taxes are often collected by unofficial agents or activists from the ruling People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), and no distinction is made between Eritrean nationals living abroad and foreign nationals of Eritrean descent. Payment is a prerequisite for any other Government service, although receipts are rarely issued. In some countries, the standard 2 per cent diaspora tax is accompanied by demands for mandatory "donations" to the Eritrean defence budget.

PFDJ raises a growing percentage of its funds through diaspora cultural events, such as concerts and folklore festivals. These are rarely, if ever, officially registered as political events, but rather as fundraisers for charitable causes — a tactic that may be prosecuted as fraud in some jurisdictions.

Another increasingly important source of revenue is gold production from mines in western Eritrea. Foreign mining interests exported over 10 tons of gold to Europe and North America in 2011, with a market value of approximately $614 million. In addition, an estimated 7.1 tons was transferred to the Government of Eritrea in 2011, potentially representing over $400 million in sales. Production and revenues are set to increase in the next few years. Since the budget and expenditure of Eritrea are not open to public scrutiny, there is very limited potential for due diligence measures to ensure that mining revenues are not spent to finance violations of resolution 1907 (2009), such as arms embargo violations or support to armed opposition groups throughout the region. The Monitoring Group therefore recommends either that Eritrea voluntarily subscribe to a transparent framework for the management of its revenue, or that Governments impose mandatory measures on mining companies and correspondent banks handling Eritrean revenues in their territories.

Since border clashes with Djibouti in June 2008, Eritrea has consistently denied holding any Djiboutian prisoners of war. The September 2011 escape of two Djiboutian prisoners of war after more than three years of detention proved Eritrea's denials to be false. At least five other Djiboutian prisoners of war were known to be still alive in September 2011, although they were surviving under dire conditions. The conduct of the Eritrean authorities in this regard constitutes a grave violation of Security Council resolutions 1862 (2009) and 1907 (2007), and raises serious doubts about Eritrea's commitment to the Qatari-led mediation process to normalize relations between the two countries. The Monitoring Group recommends that those Eritrean civilian and military officials responsible for these violations be considered for targeted sanctions.

I. Introduction

A. Mandate

1. The mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea is contained in paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 2002 (2011). Additional tasks were assigned to the Monitoring Group under resolutions 2023 (2011) and 2036 (2012).

2. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (l) of resolution 2002 (2011), the Monitoring Group kept the Security Council and its Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea informed, throughout the period of its mandate, of its activities by submitting monthly progress reports through the United Nations Secretariat and by providing a midterm briefing to the Committee on 3 February 2012.

3. In the course of their investigations, members of the Monitoring Group travelled to Belgium, Canada, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United Republic of Tanzania and the United States of America.

4. The Government of Eritrea failed to provide responses to any Monitoring Group correspondence and declined to grant the repeated requests by the Monitoring Group to visit Eritrea. This represented a deterioration in cooperation on the part of the Eritrean authorities, who have in the past granted permission for the Monitoring Group to send missions to Eritrea, although they have consistently failed to provide requested information and have denied access to officials the Monitoring Group has requested to meet.

5. The Monitoring Group was based in Nairobi and comprised the following experts: Matt Bryden (Coordinator), Emmanuel Deisser (arms expert), Aurélien Llorca (aviation expert), Jörg Roofthooft (maritime expert), Ghassan Schbley (finance expert), Babatunde Taiwo (armed groups expert) and Kristele Younes (humanitarian expert).

B. Methodology

6. The evidentiary standards and verification processes outlined in the previous reports of the Monitoring Group apply to work conducted during the current mandate. The Monitoring Group reaffirmed its methodology pursuant to its previous reports (most recently, S/2011/433). The methodology used for the current report is as follows:

(a) Collecting information on events and topics from multiple sources, where possible;

(b) Collecting information from sources with first-hand knowledge of events, where possible;

(c) Identifying consistency in patterns of information and comparing existing knowledge with new information and emerging trends;

(d) Continuously factoring in the expertise and judgement of the relevant expert of the Monitoring Group and the collective assessment of the Group with respect to the credibility of information and the reliability of sources;

(e) Obtaining physical, photographic, video and/or documentary evidence in support of the information collected.

7. The Monitoring Group made a deliberate and systematic effort to gain access to those involved in violations by way of individuals who have direct knowledge of violations or who know people who have direct knowledge about details of violations. At no time did the Monitoring Group offer payment or other inducements in exchange for testimony or evidence.

8. In conformity with the guidance provided to the Monitoring Group by the Committee on several occasions, the Group endeavoured to include as much of the testimony and evidence as possible in its final report. However, in the light of General Assembly decisions concerning the control and limitation of documentation, in particular in its resolutions 52/214, 53/208 and 59/265, much of the substance is included in annexes, which have not been translated.

II. Regional context

9. The degree of compliance by Eritrea with relevant Security Council resolutions during the course of the Monitoring Group's mandate can best be evaluated in the context of developments and dynamics in the region.

10. In Somalia, the Al-Qaida-affiliated armed opposition group, Al-Shabaab, has been steadily losing ground under the combined pressures of military offensives by African Union, Kenyan, Ethiopian and Somali Transitional Federal Government forces, and may soon be deprived of its most lucrative asset, the port of Kismaayo. The group's leadership is beginning to show signs of stress, with a clear bifurcation emerging between an extremist faction headed by Al-Shabaab "Amir" Ahmed Abdi Godane and a more pragmatic, politically oriented wing fronted by Hassan Dahir Aweys that appeals to members of his now-defunct Hisb'ul Islam opposition faction. Eritrea has maintained relations with both groups since 2006, but since 2009 has been more closely associated with Aweys and his Hisb'ul Islam associates than with Godane.[1]

11. Tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia increased following revelations that Eritrean intelligence officials had conspired to disrupt the January 2011 African Union summit in Addis Ababa with a bombing campaign. In March 2011, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was quoted in the media as stating that Ethiopia, which hosts a number of Eritrean opposition groups, would work in a diplomatic and military capacity to oust the Government in Asmara.[2] In January 2012, fighters from ARDUF, an armed group hosted by and trained in Eritrea, attacked a group of European tourists in eastern Ethiopia, killing five of them (see section III.B below).

[1] See, for example, Monitoring Group reports S/2010/91 and S/2011/433.

[2] Voice of America, "Ethiopia advocates overthrow of Eritrean Government", 19 March 2011. Available from http://www.voanews.com/content/ethiopia-advocates-overthrow-of-eritrean-government-118333254/157712.html.

Ethiopia accused Eritrea of responsibility for the incident and launched retaliatory cross-border raids in March and April 2012.

12. Asmara's relations with Djibouti also suffered a setback following the September 2011 escape of two Djiboutian prisoners of war after more than three years of detention in Eritrea (see section VII below and annex 4). Since Eritrea has consistently denied holding any Djiboutian prisoners of war following a border clash in June 2008, this revelation raised serious doubts about Eritrea's commitment to the Qatari-led mediation process to normalize relations between the two countries.

13. With the adoption of resolution 2023 (2011) the Eritrean authorities have been under additional pressure to conform to international norms, and the collection of extraterritorial taxes and use of mining revenues has been placed under scrutiny. This decision was reinforced by measures imposed by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Germany to prevent Eritrean tax collection in their territories. There has also been increasingly vocal resistance from some parts of the Eritrean diaspora against aspects of the 2 per cent diaspora tax, especially the more coercive methods used to enforce its collection and the lack of transparency with respect to its expenditure.

14. Apparently in response to such pressures, the Government of Eritrea has sought to re-engage with the international community on various levels. In January 2011, Eritrea re-opened its mission to the African Union after a five-year hiatus, and since late 2011 has sought to revive its participation in the regional organization IGAD. Such positive steps, however, must necessarily be weighed against Eritrea's continuing defiance of Security Council resolutions 1844 (2008), 1862 (2009) and 1907 (2009).

III. Support for armed groups in the region

15. In its previous report (S/2011/433), the Monitoring Group documented Eritrean support for a number of armed opposition groups in the Horn of Africa region, notably in Somalia and Eritrea.

16. Such assistance is prohibited under resolution 1907 (2009), which effectively prohibits support from Eritrea to armed opposition groups which aim to destabilize the region, as well as harbouring, financing, facilitating, supporting, organizing, training or inciting individuals or groups to perpetrate acts of violence or terrorist acts against other States or their citizens in the region.

17. During the current mandate, the Monitoring Group has confirmed that Eritrea continues to harbour, train and equip armed opposition groups from neighbouring countries, especially Ethiopia, in violation of resolution 1907 (2009). As during the previous mandate of the Monitoring Group, some members of these armed groups are deployed from Eritrea via Somalia, in violation of the general and complete arms embargo and resolution 1844 (2008).

A. Somalia

18. The Monitoring Group received no credible reports or evidence of assistance from Eritrea to armed opposition groups in Somalia during the course of the mandate. Although it is possible that the Eritrean authorities have continued to provide financial and other forms of assistance to armed opposition groups without their activities being detected, it is the Monitoring Group's assessment that any such assistance is negligible, and that Eritrea is currently a marginal actor in Somalia, with little, if any, influence, either positive or negative, on the course of events.

19. The Group is nevertheless concerned by Eritrea's continuing relationship with arms dealers and facilitators in Somalia known to have provided services and support to Al-Shabaab (see annex 1.1).

Alleged arms deliveries by air to Al-Shabaab

20. On 29 October 2011, a member of the Transitional Federal Parliament, Mohamud Abdullahi Waliye "Waqa", declared to Radio Gaalkacyo that a plane carrying arms from Eritrea had landed the same day at Baidoa International Airport.

21. "Waqa's" allegations were echoed by an intelligence report from a military source, which stated that it was confirmed that a flight carrying anti-aircraft weapons for Al-Shabaab in Baidoa did land on the evening of Saturday, 29 October 2011, between 5 p.m. and 5.45 p.m. and that the passengers of two vehicles from the Al-Shabaab regional office in Baidoa boarded the return flight.

22. A second report, compiled by a security-related organization, asserted that a medium-size cargo civilian plane landed in Baidoa airstrip carrying military supplies on 30 October 2011 at 2.30 p.m. local time. According to the author, the plane was on ground for 130 hours, and a very large number of anti-aircraft guns were quickly offloaded by a very large number of Al-Shabaab militia.

23. Over the following days, several websites specializing in Somali media content also reported that Al-Shabaab had ordered internally displaced persons living around the airstrip to vacate their homes for several days.[3]

24. On 1 November, Kenyan Defence Forces spokesman Emmanuel Chirchir issued a statement in which he said that "on 1 November 2011, we reliably confirmed that two aircraft landed in Baidoa with arms consignment intended for Al-Shabaab".[4] On the next day, he issued a second statement, in which he said that "we can positively confirm that another aircraft with weapons has landed in Somalia".[5] On 8 November 2011, the Government of Kenya wrote a letter to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, drawing upon these reports, and

[3] See, for example, Bar-kulan "Al-Shabaab evicts people around Baidoa Airstrip", 1 November 2011, available from http://www.bar-kulan.com; and Somalia Report, Aweys Cadde, "Eritrea accused of arms delivery", 31 October 2011, available from http://www.somaliareport.com.

[4] Josh Kron, "Arms flying into Somalia for militants, Kenya says", *New York Times*, 1 November 2011; and "Two planes fly arms to Al-Shabaab", *Daily Nation*, 1 November 2011.

[5] Peter Leftie, "Shabaab gets third planeload of arms", *Daily Nation*, 2 November 2011.

asserting that available information indicated that the arms emanated from Eritrea. Both the Government of Eritrea and Al-Shabaab rejected these allegations.[6]

25. An international organization with contacts on the ground in Baidoa confirmed to the Monitoring Group the forced displacement of population from the airport perimeter on those dates, but denied that any aircraft had landed. Officials of three Governments with access to their own internal intelligence reports also separately shared with the Monitoring Group their assessments that no flights to Baidoa had taken place on those dates.

26. On the basis of information received, the Monitoring Group believes that the Al-Shabaab administration in Baidoa did indeed give instructions for internally displaced persons to leave the vicinity of the airport compound, suggesting that some flights may have been expected. However, the Monitoring Group has found no evidence to substantiate the allegations that one or more aircraft landed at Baidoa International Airport between 29 October and 3 November 2011, or that Eritrea supplied Al-Shabaab in Baidoa by air with arms and ammunition during the same period.

27. The Monitoring Group has on several occasions requested that the Government of Kenya provide it with evidence substantiating the claims that during the first week of November 2011 three planes landed in the Somalia town of Baidoa.[7] To date, however, no reply has been forthcoming.

B. Ethiopia

28. The Monitoring Group obtained credible information, and in some cases firm evidence, concerning Eritrean support to the following Ethiopian armed opposition groups: ONLF, OLF, the Tigrayan People's Democratic Movement (TPDM), Gimbot Sabat and ARDUF.

29. Eritrea also hosts the remnants of other Ethiopian opposition groups, such as Arbengnoch, Debub-Hizboch, and Beni Shangul, but these are now low in numbers and have shown little, if any, operational capability during the course of the mandate.[8]

Ogaden National Liberation Front/Oromo Liberation Front

30. On 31 October 2011, a combined group of ONLF and OLF fighters was intercepted on the Somali side of the Somalia-Ethiopia border by members of the Somali militia group, Ahlu Sunna wal-Jama'a. The ONLF/OLF group had recently deployed from Eritrea, entering Somalia via different routes before linking up in Gaalkacyo to make the cross-border journey.[9] Another, larger group of ONLF

[6] *Al-Jazeera*, "Eritrea denies sending arms to Al-Shabaab", 2 November 2011; according to Josh Kron of the *New York Times*, op. cit., Al-Shabaab spokesman, Ali Mohamud Rage, stated that his organization had nothing to do with Eritrea, adding that "we take our weapons from the African Union".

[7] Meetings with Kenyan officials on 3 and 22 December 2011, and official correspondence.

[8] Interviews with former Eritrean military trainers and a senior officer, 14 January 2012 and 20 April 2012; interview with an intelligence agency, 18 May 2012.

[9] Interviews with five surviving members of the force in Ethiopian custody, Jigjiga, Ethiopia, 22 and 23 November 2011.

fighters reportedly arrived in Somalia from Eritrea at roughly the same time, disembarking at Mareero, near Boosaaso.

31. According to the four surviving members of the force in Ethiopian custody, they were members of an ONLF cohort sent for training in Eritrea in late 2007, and had been based first at Kiloma, then at Een. One of the fighters, Abdi Baruud Hassan, had been trained together with 60 men who eventually deployed to Somalia as the ill-fated Alanside force (see S/2011/433).

32. Details provided to the Monitoring Group by survivors of the force concerning training facilities and instructors in Eritrea were consistent with the accounts of other ONLF fighters known to have been trained there. Moreover, the Monitoring Group was able to verify elements of the group's travel itinerary, substantiating their accounts. A detailed account of this incident is contained in annex 1.1.

33. By the Monitoring Group's estimates, less than 100 ONLF fighters remained in Eritrea following the deployment of the Alanside force in 2010. If the reports of a large ONLF unit disembarking near Boosaaso in late 2011 are correct, then the number of fighters remaining in Eritrea could be very low. No reports of new recruitment have been received, suggesting that these may be the last ONLF fighters remaining in the country. This would be consistent with reports that the relationship between Asmara and ONLF has become increasingly strained in the past year, in part over questions of strategy and in part over exploratory contacts between the Government of Ethiopia and some ONLF leaders about the prospects for dialogue.

Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front

34. During the night of 17/18 January 2012, between approximately 11 p.m. and 1 a.m., gunmen raided a tourist camp located at the top of the Erta'Ale volcano, in the Afar region of eastern Ethiopia.[10] Twenty foreign tourists were present in the camp at the time.

35. Two Germans, two Hungarians and one Austrian were shot dead; one Belgian and one Briton were gravely wounded by gunshot wounds; and four Germans and two Ethiopian nationals (a driver and a local policeman) were initially taken captive.[11] The wounded were carried down from the top of the volcano by improvised stretcher to the base camp. Then they were evacuated by helicopter to Meqele hospital on 18 January 2012. ARDUF captors released two elderly Germans that same night, when one of them refused to march on. Both returned to the camp at Erta'Ale.

36. In a communiqué issued on 21 January 2012, ARDUF claimed responsibility for the raid, stating that its forces had killed 16 Ethiopian soldiers. The statement acknowledged that two German and two Ethiopians were in ARDUF custody, but claimed that the five dead tourists were killed by the Ethiopian forces who were accompanying them. The communiqué also asserted **that the Government of Eritrea had nothing to do with the incident**.[12]

[10] Interview on 29 February 2012 with a European government official who had been on Erta'Ale the day before the attack.

[11] Interview with the German Federal Criminal Police Office, Berlin, 21 March 2012.

[12] ARDUF military communiqué, MCC Ref : 001/2012, 21 January 2012. The communiqué erroneously describes the incident as having taken place on 16 January 2012.

37. A press statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia on 24 January 2012 charged the Government of Eritrea with responsibility for the raid, and of using ARDUF as a deniable scapegoat.[13]

38. On 5 March, ARDUF announced that the two German hostages had been released under the auspices of a group of Afar elders, and on 11 June 2012, the two Ethiopian hostages were freed.

39. In light of Eritrea's historical association with ARDUF, the Monitoring Group conducted an investigation to ascertain whether Eritrea bore any responsibility, direct or indirect, for this particular incident. The Monitoring Group interviewed persons present at the Erta'Ale camp during the attack, one of the injured tourists, officials from concerned Governments, and various law enforcement agencies investigating the incident, including the German Federal Criminal Police Office.[14]

Relations of the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front with Eritrea

40. Founded in 1993, ARDUF (also known as Uguugumo) was originally a consortium of three Afar organizations opposed to the Government of Ethiopia. ARDUF fights for greater autonomy for the Afar region.[15] The movement opposed the secession of Eritrea and initially refused to recognize Eritrea as an independent state.

41. ARDUF is internally divided, operating more as a loose coalition of factions than as a single, united front. Elements of ARDUF have at times aligned with Ethiopia against Eritrea (notably during the 1998-2000 war), but most of its military activities have historically been conducted against Ethiopia. ARDUF press statements and communiqués no longer take issue with Eritrea's right to exist.

42. ARDUF has a long history of taking foreigners as captives, including three Italians in March 1995, two United Nations consultants in 1996 and a group of five Britons and eight Ethiopians in March 2007. The latter group was released in Eritrea, through the good offices of the Government of Eritrea. ARDUF has never been known to deliberately kill any foreign nationals.

43. An Afar rebel from Djibouti, quoted in the Monitoring Group's previous report (S/2011/433), stated that he was aware of ARDUF forces being trained near Kiloma, in Eritrea's Red Sea Province. This information has since been corroborated by other former Eritrean military sources and members of ARDUF, in interviews conducted on 4 and 5 July 2012. ARDUF sources also confirmed to the Monitoring Group, in interviews conducted on 5 July, that as at July 2012 ARDUF maintained representation in Assab and was receiving logistical support, including ammunition, from the Government of Eritrea.

44. More recently the Monitoring Group has obtained credible information and evidence that some ARDUF forces have recently been hosted and trained in Eritrea under the auspices of Lieutenant Colonel "Hatsaynet", Chief of Military Intelligence for the Eastern Zone (see S/2011/433, paras. 262 (e) and 274), and Major

[13] See http://www.mfa.gov.et/PressMore.php?pg=34.

[14] Interview with a Liaison Officer of the German Federal Criminal Police Office, Embassy of Germany, Nairobi, 9 May 2012.

[15] ARDUF was formed in March 1993, merging the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Union, the Afar Ummatah Demokrasiyyoh Focca and the Afar Revolutionary Forces.

"Debesay", an Eritrean military intelligence officer active in the Southern Red Sea region. Major "Debesay" was allegedly responsible for liaison with Mussa Ibrahim, the Chair of ARDUF, as well as Ali Yalele, its principal intelligence officer and liaison with the Eritrean military. Both Lieutenant Colonel "Hatsaynet" and Major "Debesay" report to Brigadier General Te'ame Goitom (also known as Wedi Meqele) (see S/2011/433, para. 262 (a)).

45. Until late 2011, ARDUF fighters were also trained in the Ghelaalo area, in northern Red Sea Province. The training commander was reportedly Captain Daoud Suleiman, a military officer with expertise in mines and mine clearance operations. Captain Suleiman worked closely with international personnel from the United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia in the years following the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia.[16]

46. Captain Suleiman was assisted by Mohamed Omar Hashim of ARDUF and Captain Temesgen Haile, a combat engineer and logistician who has served as a military observer in Darfur (March 2009).

47. The Monitoring Group obtained a partial list, independently verified by two sources, of the ARDUF trainees at Wandedel and We'ema in late 2011. Law enforcement officials probing the Erta'Ale incident in early 2012 confirmed that five of the names matched those of suspects in their own investigation.

48. On 16 March 2012, Ethiopian military units raided three Eritrean military bases in retaliation for the ARDUF raid. Ethiopian incursions into western Eritrea with apparently limited military aims continued through June 2012.[17]

Analysis and conclusions

49. The Monitoring Group has seen no evidence to suggest that the Government of Eritrea bears direct responsibility for the planning or conduct of the operation at Erta'Ale or for the killings. In interviews, however, survivors of the incident unequivocally refuted the allegation by ARDUF that the tourists were killed by Ethiopian forces, since, with the exception of one Afar policeman, none were present.

50. The Monitoring Group has confirmed, however, that Eritrea continues to host, train and support ARDUF, and that some recent ARDUF trainees may have been involved in the Erta'Ale incident (see S/2011/433, para. 275 and annex 8.1). Eritrea therefore has not only acted in violation of resolution 1907 (2009), but also bears indirect responsibility for the killings of 17 January 2012 at Erta'Ale.

Tigray People's Democratic Movement

51. Eritrean support to TPDM (commonly known as Demhit) continued throughout 2011 and 2012. A former Eritrean military instructor who personally trained members of the group told the Monitoring Group that Demhit was mainly based out of Harena, but also operated from a number of smaller camps, including Een, as well as temporary positions along the Ethiopian border. Former members of

[16] Interview with a former official of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations who worked with UNMEE, 12 March 2012.

[17] Interviews with a former Eritrean military officer, 20 March 2012, and an Ethiopian official, 3 May 2012.

Eritrean army commando units also told the Monitoring Group of having encountered members of Demhit during training at Sawa and Me'atr camps (see annexes 1.1.b. and 1.1.c. for aerial views of Harena and Sawa respectively).[18]

52. In addition, several former Eritrean military sources independently told the Monitoring Group that in early 2012, Demhit's own instructor cadre staff was moved to a smaller camp closer to the Ethiopian border, about 25 kilometres south-east of Harena. The Monitoring Group interviewed former Eritrean military trainers and officers in charge, who confirmed that when Ethiopian forces raided locations in Eritrea in mid-April 2012, they specifically targeted both main Demhit bases, including Harena.[19]

Ginbot Sebat

53. The Ethiopian authorities provided the Monitoring Group access to three detainees alleged to be members of the banned opposition group, Ginbot Sebat. They were interviewed individually by two teams of the Monitoring Group on three separate dates.[20]

54. All three detainees declared that they were members of a Ginbot Sebat team captured on 1 November 2011. All three also stated that they had previously travelled to Eritrea, via Sudan, in the belief that they would be offered the opportunity to attend education programmes in Europe or North America at a later stage. Instead, they claimed to have been sent for training in the western military border zone of Eritrea.

55. The detainees told the Monitoring Group that they had received political indoctrination from Ginbot Sebat Deputy Chairman Andargachew Tsige, before being introduced to Eritrean Colonel Fitsum Yishak "Lenin" for training in the use of handguns, explosives and counter-surveillance, which they said lasted two months (see S/2011/433, para. 262 (b)).

56. The detainees all exhibited familiarity with Asmara and its landmarks, and one of the three was fully conversant with weapons and explosives. One suspect was also able to positively identify Colonel Fitsum. However, one suspect was unable to recognize basic explosive materials, to identify components of hand grenades or to hold a handgun correctly — all subjects he claimed to have been trained in the use of.

57. The Monitoring Group is persuaded, on the basis of these accounts, that all three suspects had first-hand knowledge of Asmara and its environs, and had probably had direct contact with Colonel Fitsum. However, in view of inconsistencies in their accounts, the Monitoring Group was unable to reach a conclusion as to their organizational affiliation or their exposure to military or paramilitary training.

[18] Interviews with former Eritrean army commando personnel, 29 November 2011 and 15 January 2012.

[19] Interviews with former Eritrean military trainers and a senior officer, 14 January 2012 and 20 April 2012; interview with an intelligence agency, 18 May 2012.

[20] Interview with Ginbot Sebat detainees, 21, 22 and 23 November 2011.

IV. Violations of the general and complete arms embargo

58. The general and complete arms embargo on Eritrea appears to have been largely respected; however, the Monitoring Group believes that the Government of Eritrea continues to procure military material and external assistance in order to maintain part of its air force.

59. Senior Eritrean officials, notably General Teklai Kifle "Manjus", Commander of the Western Sector, continue to be engaged in arms trafficking to Sudan — a trade that impacts regional security as far away as Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

A. Eritrean air force

60. The Eritrean air force is the smallest branch of the armed forces. It is under the command of Major General Teklai Habteselassie, and its main operational base is in Asmara. No military aircraft are permanently based in Massawa, Assab or Sawa. Its most sophisticated fighter aircraft are Mig-29 Fulcrums, Su-27 Flankers and Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships.

61. Keeping this small but relatively sophisticated fleet of aircraft operational requires a high level of technical expertise, rigorous maintenance schedules and a steady flow of spare parts and lubricants. Basic flight servicing includes condition-based maintenance and corrective maintenance, which is required after each cycle of take-off and landing; however, it excludes random faults or repairs related to accidents. Minimum requirements for this service schedule include a regular and reliable supply of spare parts: landing gear tyres, wheel bearings, spark plugs, bulbs, lights, batteries, filters, brake pads, oil and oxygen. In addition, hydraulic brake system fluid must be replenished, faulty avionics systems replaced and on-board software updated. This has historically necessitated a reliable foreign source of supply and the engagement of foreign technical personnel.

62. The general and complete arms embargo on Eritrea prohibits the sale or supply to Eritrea of arms and related materiel of all types, including spare parts for the aforementioned and technical assistance, training, financial and other assistance. In theory, this means that the air force has been denied the technical assistance and spare parts upon which it has long depended, and its operational readiness should therefore have been affected.

63. The Monitoring Group has therefore sought to determine whether the air force has been able to adhere to maintenance schedules, as an indication of whether foreign technicians and imported spare parts are still entering Eritrea in violation of the arms embargo. Since the Government denied it the opportunity to visit Eritrea, however, the Monitoring Group has not been able to verify its findings first hand.

64. On the basis of this provisional assessment, the Monitoring Group believes that the embargo is indeed affecting maintenance schedules and adversely affecting the operational readiness of the air force. However, even the current, low level of air force activity could probably not be maintained without some access to these prohibited items, suggesting that Eritrea is able to meet some of its needs either with the assistance of friendly States or on international black markets.

Maintenance of Eritrean military aircraft

65. The Monitoring Group has confirmed that the air force previously engaged Ukrainian personnel associated with MigRemont, the main overhaul facility for Mig and Sukhoi jet fighters in Ukraine (see figure I below).

Figure I
MigRemont senior technician in Asmara alongside Eritrean air force personnel, circa 2002

66. Located in Zaporizhya, Ukraine, MigRemont was originally a military repair facility located on the air force base, but in 1996 it became a State-owned company. In 2011, the ownership of the company was transferred from the Ministry of Defence to the new defence holding company Ukroboronprom.

67. As a former aviation cluster for Soviet-era military and industrial production, Zaporizhya remains a hub for brokers (many of whom are former MigRemont personnel) pursuing overseas orders for maintenance, spare parts and overhaul work for Russian-made aircraft. The Monitoring Group was informed by a Ukrainian official that one of these brokers, Zaporizhya Regional Foreign Economic Agency, had been engaged in discussions with the Government of Eritrea to provide spare parts for helicopters in 2001. The Agency is also known to have been sanctioned by the Government of the United States in connection with alleged violations of the sanctions regime on Iran.

68. According to a source with direct knowledge of the aviation sector in Zaporizhya, Zaporizhya Regional Foreign Economic Agency is well known in the aviation business as an underground supplier of aviation parts and overhaul services to African countries and continues to cooperate closely with MigRemont. The Agency is also associated with Espace Soft Trading Limited, a British company

incorporated in 1998 and specialized in manufacture of metal structures and parts.[21] The Monitoring Group has obtained information indicating that Espace Soft Trading Limited has been regularly exporting military material to Rwanda and Uganda since 2001.

69. The Monitoring Group has received credible indications of external logistical and technical support for the Eritrean air force in violation of resolution 1907 (2009), including reports of approaches by the head of the air force himself to foreign companies, including Espace Soft Trading Limited, that could potentially provide the fleet of aircraft of the air force with spare part and specialized services.

Current status of the Eritrean air force

70. The Monitoring Group has been able to determine that the Eritrean air force fleet currently includes 22 fixed-wing and 7 rotary-wing aircraft. Of these, only 7 are currently known to be operational (see table below). The Monitoring Group believes that the remainder are currently non-serviceable.

Type of aircraft	*Number*	*Operational in May 2012*	*Registration numbers*	*Comments*
MiG-29 Fulcrum	7	2	ERAF 501	Single-seater
			ERAF 502	
			ERAF 504	
			ERAF 505	
			ERAF 508	
Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker	2	1	ERAF 608	1 single-seater SK
			ERAF 609	1 two-seater UB
Aermacchi MB-339C	4	—	ERAF 408	
Harbin Y-12	2	2	ERAF 801	
Aero L-39 Albatross	1	—		At least 1 two-seater advanced trainer version, probably former Ethiopian air force
L-90TP Redigo	6	—		
Augusta Bell-412	2	—	ERAF 702	
Mil Mi-17 Hip	3	2	ERAF 301	
			ERAF 306	
Mil Mi-35 Hind E	2	—		At least one was reportedly seized from the Ethiopian air force

71. Based on this information, it is the assessment of the Monitoring Group that the Eritrean air force is only able to sustain all phases of maintenance operations for approximately 30 per cent of its fleet.

72. This assessment is corroborated by an Eritrean defector with detailed knowledge of the structure and operations of the Eritrean air force and remaining

[21] Registered on 6 August 1998; Oleg Krasnoselskyi, the son of the Director General of Zaporizhya Regional Foreign Economic Agency, Vitalii Krasnoselskyi, was appointed Director of the company on 17 June 2009.

contacts on the ground, who has told the Monitoring Group that imposition of the arms embargo in December 2009 severely disrupted the supply chain for spare parts and led to the termination of some bilateral maintenance contracts.[22]

73. Moreover, according to the same defector, several senior technicians in charge of the maintenance of air force aircraft have fled the country, further eroding the capability of the air force to respect mandatory maintenance schedules and standards.

74. A diplomatic source in Asmara has confirmed that the activity of air force jet fighters had considerably decreased, with only one overflight of the Eritrean capital observed between end of February and May 2012.[23]

75. Close observation of movements of aircraft at the military apron of Asmara airport based on imagery available on Google Earth indicate some activity, including refuelling of aircraft and the construction in 2011 of an 875 m^2 hangar. However, with hangar space available for at least nine aircraft, it is unclear why even high performance aircraft should be left on the apron all year round (including the rainy season), unless it is for display purposes rather than operations.

Figure II
Military apron of Asmara airport, 1 March 2012

[22] Interviews, 9 March, 9 April and 4 and 5 May 2012.
[23] Electronic communication, 18 May 2012.

76. The Monitoring Group believes that it is highly unlikely that even this reduced level of air force activity could be sustained on the basis of domestic resources alone. In sum, it is the Monitoring Group's assessment that, although the arms embargo has been partially effective, the air force continues to obtain some external technical assistance and to import spare parts in violation of resolution 1907 (2009).

B. Trafficking in arms and people

77. In its July 2011 report, the Monitoring Group described the involvement of senior members of the Eritrean security services, notably General Teklai Kifle "Manjus", in the trafficking of weapons and people from Eritrea into Egypt (the Sinai) via Sudan, en route to Israel. The trafficking of arms and people is managed by the same networks using the same vehicles, and the same Eritrean officials are implicated.

78. The Monitoring Group has since learned that this activity exists on a much greater scale than previously believed. According to the Population, Immigration and Border Authority of Israel 58,088 asylum seekers entered Israel through the Israel-Egypt border between 2006 and February 2012. Of these, 56.5 per cent (or 32,082) were from Eritrea.[24] Statistics of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) indicate a much higher figure, with 59,969 Eritreans entering Israel via Egypt between 2009 and 2011.[25]

79. The experiences of these asylum seekers are well documented. Non-governmental organizations in Israel have recorded over 1,300 testimonies from African asylum seekers, more than half of which are from Eritrea.[26] Of these, 61 referred to Rashaida and Bedouin traffickers by name, often describing the physical and psychological torture they inflicted on their captives.

80. Multiple independent sources in Israel and the Sinai have identified General Teklai Kifle Manjus, and Colonel Fitsum Yishak (see S/2011/433, para. 262 (b)), as well as a string of intermediaries, as being directly responsible for the cross-border smuggling of humans and weapons from Eritrea.

81. A sample of transcripts from interviews with Eritrean migrants is contained in annex 2.2.

Trafficking networks

82. Trafficking operations begin in western Eritrea, under the auspices of General Manjus. According to a former translator for a smuggling network in the Sinai, weapons for export were organized in 2011 by two military officers under the command of Manjus named Borhame and Yesef Hadegu. The former translator stated as follows: "Manjus gets all the money. They don't get anything. They are in the military so they just do what they are told" (see annex 2.2.).

---

[24] See http://www.piba.gov.il/.

[25] UNHCR Frequently requested Statistics (see http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a0174156.html) and UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database (see http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/populationdatabase).

[26] In September 2011, 1,304 asylum seekers entered Israel from Egypt; in October 2011, 1,998; in November 2011, 2698; in December 2011, 2,869; in January 2012, 2,176; and in February 2012, 1,531. See http://www.piba.gov.il/PublicationAndTender/ForeignWorkersStat/Documents/%202012אפריל.pdf.

83. The weapons are generally described as Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. Many bear the inscriptions of the Eritrean military units to which they previously belonged.[27] The weapons are driven across the border via Teseney to Wadi Sharifay, where they are delivered into the hands of Rashaida trafficking networks at a reported cost of approximately $250 per rifle. They are sold in Egypt to Palestinian brokers at a much higher price.

84. From Sudan, Rashaida smugglers sell space on trucks to Eritrean migrants for an average fee of $3,000. They have also been known to abduct refugees from camps in eastern Sudan. The trucks are loaded with weapons and ammunition, and the passengers and their goods ride on top to conceal the cargo.

85. To transit Egypt, Rashaida smugglers hand the migrants over to Bedouin traffickers. However, instead of delivering the passengers to their destination, the traffickers routinely hold their passengers captive and demand exorbitant ransoms from their families for their release — typically between $30,000 and $50,000. If ransom is not paid, hostages may find themselves brutally tortured or killed. Some Bedouin smugglers have told their captives that they will remove and sell their vital organs if payment is not forthcoming.

86. One prominent Sinai-based trafficker, known as Abu Ahmed, reportedly used to take delivery of at least 1,200 small arms per month, as well as large quantities of ammunition. The value of this trade to General Manjus's network would therefore be worth a minimum of $300,000 per month or $3.6 million per year for weapons alone, excluding ammunition.

V. Revenue collection outside Eritrea

87. In its resolution 2023 (2011) the Security Council condemned the use of the diaspora tax by the Eritrean Government to destabilize the Horn of Africa region or violate relevant resolutions, including for purposes such as procuring arms and related materiel for transfer to armed opposition groups or providing any services or financial transfers directly or indirectly to such groups. The Council also decided that Eritrea should cease using extortion, threats of violence, fraud and other illicit means to collect taxes outside of Eritrea from its nationals or other individuals of Eritrean descent.

88. The Monitoring Group has therefore conducted investigations to determine whether the Eritrean authorities do in fact employ extortion, threats of violence, fraud or other illicit means to collect taxes outside Eritrea, as well as the purposes to which the revenues from such taxes are directed. A more detailed account of its findings is contained in annex 3.1.

General observations on Eritrean extraterritorial revenue collection

89. The Government of Eritrea and the ruling PFDJ impose a variety of extraterritorial taxation requirements on Eritrean citizens resident abroad and foreign nationals of Eritrean descent. In addition, members of the Eritrean diaspora

[27] Confidential interviews shared with the Monitoring Group, Tel Aviv, Israel, 6, 7 and 9 June 2012.

are also encouraged to make "voluntary" contributions to a variety of causes, although in practice individuals may be penalized if they do not comply.

90. Procedures for payment of Eritrean extraterritorial taxes vary from location to location. In places where an embassy or consulate exists, it is usually made directly at the embassy. Where there is no official representation, local PFDJ agents or activists act as tax collectors. In Seattle, Washington, for example, taxes can be paid through an Eritrean-owned travel agency.[28] Whether or not the techniques they employ are extortive or illicit is often a matter of national or state law, and depends upon such questions as whether or not the collector is a diplomat or other registered agent of a foreign power, the nationality of the collector and the kinds of legal and administrative loopholes employed by collectors.

91. Eritrean officials and party agents routinely resort to threats, intimidation and coercive measures in order to elicit payment. The most common tactic is the denial of unrelated services until taxes have been paid. Other measures include harassment, intimidation and the threat of retribution in Eritrea: individuals who refuse to make payment may have their inheritance rights voided; their family members may be penalized; and they may be subject to detention or denial of an exit visa if they return to Eritrea.

92. Since the passage of resolutions 1907 (2009) and 2023 (2011), methods of Eritrean extraterritorial revenue collection have come under greater scrutiny and are facing mounting challenges. On 20 May 2011, the Government of the United Kingdom notified the Eritrean authorities that, since aspects of the collection of the 2 per cent tax may be unlawful and in breach of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, until it was demonstrated otherwise, the Eritrean embassy should suspend, immediately and in full, all activities relating to the collection of the tax.[29] The Government of Germany has also demanded that Eritrea cease collection of the 2 per cent tax involving the use of Eritrean diplomatic missions on German territory.[30] Members of the Eritrean diaspora have increasingly begun to challenge the legality of the tax under the laws of their host countries.[31]

93. As a result, revenue collection techniques are increasingly designed to avoid direct confrontation with host countries' investigators and prosecutors, and increasingly resemble the clandestine fundraising techniques employed by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) during the liberation struggle — without the same degree of popular support that they once enjoyed.[32] Greater emphasis has been placed on voluntary contributions through concerts and cultural events

[28] Interviews, Seattle, Washington, United States, 28 March 2012.

[29] Foreign Office statement, "Foreign Office concern at being denied consular access to detainees in Eritrea", 26 May 2011. According to Elsa Chyrum, an Eritrean human rights activist, Eritrean Government and party agents have since resumed tax collection across the United Kingdom. Eritrean officials in the United Kingdom demand to inspect P60 forms (official British pay and tax summary) to compute the Eritrean 2 per cent tax.

[30] German diplomatic source, 22 April 2012.

[31] In Canada alone, between 2010 and 2012, members of the Eritrean diaspora registered complaints concerning PFDJ fundraising activities on four separate occasions: one in Calgary, one in Winnipeg and two in Ottawa.

[32] During the Ethiopian civil war (1975-1991), EPLF employed covert procedures to finance clandestine support of its war effort against the Mengistu regime. Interview with former Eritrean diplomat, London, 11 September 2011.

organized by PFDJ agents and activists, but even these may be illegal under certain circumstances (see the section on cultural events and annex 3.1 below).

Two per cent development and rehabilitation tax

94. What the Security Council in its resolution 2023 (2011) calls a diaspora tax is referred to by the Eritrean authorities as the 2 per cent development and rehabilitation tax, "enacted in 1994 by the National Assembly to provide some cushion to the hefty annual budgetary bills that the Government continues to shoulder to date to support the war disabled and the families of martyrs".[33] In a letter to the Committee dated 18 April 2012, the Government of Eritrea denied that the tax was extrajudicial, and referred to a specific law published in an official Gazette in 1994, without further elaboration. The letter also made reference to "some administrative regulations that are applicable for those who evade or refuse to comply with them", including "forfeiting certain entitlements such as title to ownership of real estate and business privileges", but affirmed that "these measures are not, and cannot, be enforced extraterritorially".

95. The Monitoring Group has collected numerous testimonies from diaspora Eritreans and host country authorities describing the various techniques employed by Eritrean embassy personnel and PFDJ representatives to elicit payment.[34] According to a recent Royal Canadian Mounted Police assessment, which is consistent with the Monitoring Group's own findings, refusal to pay the tax often results in denial of service or threats against, or harassment of, family members still residing in Eritrea, or possible arrest of the individual should they travel to Eritrea without paying the taxes alleged to be owing.

96. For diaspora Eritreans, payment of 2 per cent income tax is a prerequisite for obtaining any government service, and is retroactive to the date of the last payment of the tax.[35] Any contact with an Eritrean embassy or consulate, whether for renewal of a passport, issuance of a visa, family reunification, or inheritance matters, automatically triggers a demand for retroactive payment of taxes.

97. Applicants may also be required to sign an immigration and citizenship services request form, also known as a B4 form or a regret letter. The form requires the applicant to sign a statement of "regret [for] having committed an offence by not completing the national service" and indicating readiness to accept appropriate punishment in due course (see annex 3.1.b).

98. Requests for service by relatives living in Eritrea can also trigger a demand for payment of tax by a diaspora member. Renewals of annual business licences or requests for Power of Attorney may be refused if a family member in the diaspora has not paid the taxes. If the demand for payment is rejected, then relatives in

[33] "Statement by Mr. Araya Desta, Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations, during the informal consultations of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, New York, 18 April 2012.

[34] Multiple interviews with credible Eritrean diaspora members and former high-ranking officials in Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, September 2011; Oakland, California, and Seattle, Washington, United States, 27 and 28 March 2012; and Washington, D.C., United States, during January and April 2012.

[35] For Eritreans who have never paid the diaspora tax, PFDJ forms and agents calculate arrears in income tax due retroactively to 1992.

Eritrea are often required to formally repudiate the diaspora family member or suffer the consequences.[36]

99. Lastly, diaspora Eritreans who return home for a visit may be delayed or detained if they have not paid the 2 per cent tax. The Eritrean authorities do not distinguish between Eritrean nationals resident abroad and foreign nationals of Eritrean origin. Foreign passport holders may therefore also be denied access to the consular services of their country of citizenship pending resolution of the matter.

Contributions to the Eritrean defence forces

100. In some countries, diaspora Eritreans may be required to make a contribution to the Eritrean defence budget, in addition to the 2 per cent tax. In Canada, for example, the 2 per cent tax form makes provision for contributions for the purposes of national defence, described as "donations to national defence against Ethiopian invasion" (see annex 3.1.c.).[37]

101. Such donations, however, are not necessarily voluntary. Multiple sources with direct personal experience of this requirement, told the Monitoring Group that if an Eritrean agreed to pay the 2 per cent tax, but refused to make a contribution to the Eritrean defence budget, they could be penalized as though they had refused to pay the diaspora tax.[38]

102. In the opinion of the Monitoring Group, solicitation of contributions to Eritrean military expenditure arguably violate paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1907 (2009), which requires Member States to take the necessary measures to prevent, inter alia, financial assistance related to Eritrean military activities covered by the arms embargo.

Cultural events

103. The solicitation by PFDJ of voluntary contributions includes an increasing reliance on fundraising at folklore festivals and other cultural events organized across Europe, North America and in countries where political rallies are forbidden.[39] A secondary purpose of these events is typically to allow PFDJ agents and activists to gauge loyalty to the party within diaspora communities.[40] According to Western law enforcement officials who monitor such events, PFDJ fundraising at such festivals and concerts is fast becoming a major source of hard currency for the Eritrean authorities.[41]

104. The organization of such events may not always be transparent or legal. Many PFDJ activities are described as Eritrean community functions, not as political

[36] Interviews, Seattle, Washington, United States, 27 March 2012, and Oakland, California, United States, 28 March 2012.

[37] Aaron Berhane, "Eritrean repression follows emigrants to Canada", *The Star*, 14 May 2012.

[38] Interviews, 18 January 2012 and 3 June 2012.

[39] Interviews and e-mail communications with Royal Canadian Mounted Police, April, May and June 2012.

[40] David Bozzini, an expert on Eritrea working at the University of Neuchâtel says that the Eritrean Government is particularly keen on controlling those who have dodged the permanent military draft back home by seeking asylum abroad in "Eritreans complain of intimidation", 1 February 2012. Also multiple interviews with diaspora informants and law enforcement sources.

[41] Interview, 31 January and 3 April 2012.

activities, and PFDJ-dominated Eritrean community centres may conceal their political nature in order to obtain financial assistance from their host Governments. A PFDJ fundraising drive in Canada in early 2012 falsely presented itself as a campaign to assist Eritrean orphans and children, in potential violation of Canadian law (see annex 3.1.).

Responses by the Government of Eritrea and the People's Front for Democracy and Justice to resolution 2023 (2011)

105. The response of the Eritrean authorities to greater international scrutiny and the adoption of Security Council resolution 2023 (2011) has been to make the process of extraterritorial revenue collection even more informal and opaque.

106. A key feature of this informal revenue collection system is an intrinsic lack of documentation of the process itself. Apart from embassy and consular officials, Eritrean tax collectors are generally neither diplomats, nor declared agents of a foreign Government or political organization. In the United States, for example, the Monitoring Group has learned that no PFDJ representative or agent is currently registered with the United States Department of Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

107. Eritrean embassies and consulates no longer offer receipts for payment of the tax. Regret letters are retained by embassies, without copies being provided to the signatories. Movement of funds has shifted further away from official bank accounts into hard currency cash payments handled by PFDJ agents and activists via designated private bank accounts outside Eritrea.[42] Cairo and Dubai continue to be routinely cited as key PFDJ financial hubs, but Kampala and Juba are both rapidly gaining in importance.[43]

VI. Revenues from the mining sector and due diligence

108. In its resolution 2023 (2011) the Security Council called upon Eritrea to show transparency in its public finances, including through cooperation with the Monitoring Group, and requested the Committee, with the assistance of the Monitoring Group, to draft guidelines for the optional use of Member States to prevent funds derived from the mining sector of Eritrea from contributing to violations of resolutions 1844 (2008), 1862 (2009), 1907 (2009) or 2023 (2011).

109. The response by the Government of Eritrea to resolution 2023 (2011) was that the introduction of due diligence guidelines "cannot be justified" and "will encumber investment opportunities and economic growth in a developing country".[44] The Eritrean authorities did not elaborate, in practical terms, on how

[42] Interviews with a former Eritrean diplomat, September 2011, and with a former PFDJ tax collector, Seattle, Washington, United States, 27 March 2012; see also S/2011/433, paras. 372-414.

[43] Interview with officials from a European State, 13 January 2012; interview with an Eritrean community leader, Seattle, Washington, United States, 27 March 2012.

[44] Letter dated 28 March 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea.

greater transparency in the management of natural resource wealth would undermine investment or economic growth in Eritrea.

110. The Eritrean authorities also declined to cooperate with the Monitoring Group with respect to the Security Council's request for transparency in the use of revenues generated by gold exports (see Council resolution 2023 (2011), para. 12).

Revenues from gold mining

111. The Eritrean mining sector, especially gold mining, is currently still in its developmental phase. Within Eritrea, foreign investors must engage in joint ventures with the State-owned Eritrean National Mining Company. Investments and revenues are channelled through diverse and often corporate structures, which have been established in Eritrea and are in various stages of development. Obscure contractual arrangements further complicate the conduct of a comprehensive evaluation.

112. According to figures published by the Canada-based mining company, Nevsun, which operates the Bisha mine, 10.7 tons of Eritrean gold ore were produced in 2011, with an average market value of $1,620 per ounce (more than five times the cash cost of production). The Monitoring Group has learned that the gold ore was exported by airfreight to Europe and North America[45] and that additional tonnage of ore products was also shipped by air to the Middle East and South Asia.[46] While Nevsun recorded revenues of $548 million from its Eritrean operations in 2011, the total revenues accruing to the Government of Eritrea are unknown. However, under the terms of Nevsun's contract, an estimated 7.1 tons of ore were transferred to the Eritrean authorities in 2011, potentially representing over $400 million in sales.[47]

Due diligence in the management of mining sector revenues[48]

113. Public finance management in Eritrea is generally rated as opaque. The national budget is not publicly available. In its interim country strategy paper for Eritrea 2009-2011, The African Development Bank Group observes that transparency of public finance management remains limited in Eritrea rendering the task of assessing the quality of public finance management difficult. The country was ranked forty-eighth out of 53 African States in Mo Ibrahim Foundation's 2011 index of African governance, and one hundred and thirty-fourth out of 182 countries in Transparency International's 2011 corruption perceptions index.[49] The World Bank rated Eritrea one hundred eightieth out of 183 countries worldwide in terms of the ease of doing business.[50] In its country profile for Eritrea, the Globaltrade.net, a

[45] Interviews with Government officials, November 2011 and January 2012; interview with Gilles Labarthe, researcher specializing in the gold mining sector, Geneva, September 2011.

[46] Interview with an air cargo specialist with knowledge of flights from Eritrea, May 2012.

[47] See http://www.nevsun.com/news/2012/march21.

[48] The Eritrean authorities routinely contest the validity of external assessments and global surveys of the kind referred to in the present section. However, the Government of Eritrea does not publish much financial data and the data it publishes generally cannot be independently verified. As the Eritrean authorities declined to cooperate with the Monitoring Group, the Group had no choice but to rely on publicly available data and analysis of the Eritrean economy.

[49] See http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org and http://www.transparency.org.

[50] See http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/eritrea/.

network for international trade services states that there is no official data on Foreign Direct Investments available from the country's central bank.[51]

114. In this context, the tracking of mining sector revenues to ensure that they are not used to violate relevant Security Council resolutions is especially challenging. The Monitoring Group has therefore developed three options for the Committee's consideration.

Option 1: voluntary disclosure and earmarking

115. Under option 1 the voluntary participation of the Government of Eritrea is proposed in an international framework for the management of natural resource revenues, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which would commit the Eritrean authorities and its private sector partners to the following principles:[52]

(a) Regular publication of all mining payments by companies to Governments ("payments") and all material revenues received by Governments from mining companies ("revenues") to a wide audience in a publicly accessible, comprehensive and comprehensible manner;

(b) Where such audits do not already exist, payments and revenues are the subject of a credible, independent audit, applying international auditing standards;

(c) Until the Security Council decides to terminate the measures imposed in resolution 2023 (2011), revenues should be earmarked for non-military expenditure;

(d) Payments, revenues and related expenditures are reconciled by a credible, independent administrator, applying international auditing standards and with publication of the administrator's opinion regarding that reconciliation, including discrepancies, should any be identified;

(e) This approach is extended to all companies including State-owned enterprises;

(f) Civil society is actively engaged as a participant in the design, monitoring and evaluation of this process and contributes towards public debate;

(g) A public, financially sustainable workplan for all of the above is developed by the host Government, with assistance from the international financial institutions, where required, including measurable targets, a timetable for implementation, and an assessment of potential capacity constraints.

116. In the context of resolution 2023 (2011), the Monitoring Group proposes that statements of payments and revenues be made available to the Committee and subject to review by the Monitoring Group, as well as any independent auditor engaged for this purpose.

Option 2: joint supervision

117. Option 2 represents an elaboration of option 1, including the establishment of an escrow account into which all payments and revenues from the mining sector

[51] See http://www.globaltrade.net/international-trade-import-exports/m/c/Eritrea.html.

[52] Adapted from EITI principles and criteria. Available from http://eiti.org/eiti/principles.

would be deposited, until the Security Council decides to terminate the measures imposed in resolution 2023 (2011).

118. The Government of Eritrea would administer the account together with an agreed third party, to be identified, and jointly authorize expenditures.

Option 3: mandatory disclosure

119. Under option 3 it is proposed that the host Governments of companies with mining interests in Eritrea should require them to disclose details of all payments made to the Government of Eritrea, whether in cash or in kind, upon request. This would permit host Governments to fulfil their obligations to the Security Council by ensuring that payments made to the Eritrean authorities would not be used for violations of relevant resolutions.

120. Requirements of disclosure would include the identification of accounts into which deposits have been made, to permit follow-up, as appropriate, by national authorities and/or the Monitoring Group.

121. The Monitoring Group also proposes that correspondent banks holding accounts in the name of the Government of Eritrea, PFDJ, or suspected fronts for either of these entities, also be subject to mandatory disclosure by their host Governments for the same purpose.

VII. Acts that obstruct the implementation of resolution 1862 (2009)

122. In its July 2011 report, the Monitoring Group took note of Eritrea's refusal to discuss the matter of 19 Djiboutian military personnel reported missing in action and believed by the Djiboutian authorities to be held in Eritrea as prisoners of war.

123. In paragraph 4 of its resolution 1907 (2009), the Security Council demanded that Eritrea make available information pertaining to Djiboutian combatants missing in action since the clashes of 10 to 12 June 2008 so that those concerned may ascertain the presence and condition of Djiboutian prisoners of war.

124. The Monitoring Group argued that it would be premature to conclude that Eritrea's silence constituted obstruction of Security Council resolution 1862 (2009). Instead, the Group recommended that the mediation by the Government of the State of Qatar be permitted additional time and scope to address all aspects of the dispute (S/2011/433, para. 430).

125. On 6 October 2011, the Permanent Representative of Djibouti to the United Nations addressed a letter to the Secretary-General informing him of the escape of two Djiboutian prisoners of war from an Eritrean prison, while noting that the Government of Eritrea had to date denied detaining any Djiboutian prisoners of war (S/2011/617).

Escape of Djiboutian prisoners of war from Eritrea

126. On 16 September 2011, two Djiboutian prisoners of war, Privates First Class Ahmed Eeleeye Yaabe and Khadir Sumbul Ali, escaped from Eritrea and presented

themselves to Sudanese police at the border post of Karuurah.[53] Their identities correspond with the list of Djiboutian military personnel reported missing in action on 10 June 2008. The Monitoring Group interviewed the former prisoners of war in Djibouti on 8 January 2012.

127. Yaabe and Ali were captured near Ras Doumeira on 10 June 2008 together with five other Djiboutian soldiers. Five of the seven had been injured during the fighting and received superficial first aid before being transferred to a holding facility in Assab, where they were interrogated and remained in detention for almost two months.

128. From Assab, the group was transferred via Asmara to military prison camp at Shabay-Mandar, near the city of Afabet, where they remained for the next three years and one month. Although they were not physically abused, conditions in detention were severe. All seven prisoners of war became malnourished, and two went blind. No medical attention was available for those with injuries: those with bullets and shrapnel in their bodies went untreated, and one lost the use of his arm. By the date of their escape from the prison on 5 September 2011, only Yaabe and Ali were strong and healthy enough to make the attempt.

129. A more detailed account of their detention and escape is contained in the letter dated 6 October 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Djibouti to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2011/617) and in annex 4.1. of the present report.

Assessment

130. In a letter dated 29 November 2011 addressed to the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Eritrean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Osman Saleh Mohammed, stated that the issue of prisoners of war was addressed by article 3 of the Comprehensive Agreement signed by Djibouti and Eritrea under Qatari auspices, and that "there is no other parallel mediation modality or mechanism and it should never be created". The Minister's letter further notes that both the United Nations and the African Union have endorsed the Qatari agreement.

131. Notwithstanding the Minister's letter, the Security Council in its resolution 2023 (2011) demanded that Eritrea make available information pertaining to Djiboutian combatants missing in action since the clashes of 10 to 12 June 2008 so that those concerned may ascertain the presence and condition of Djiboutian prisoners of war. It is the understanding of the Monitoring Group that the resolution of the Security Council post-dates and supersedes the Qatari agreement.

132. The revelation that the Eritrean authorities have indeed been holding Djiboutian military personnel in their custody, and that at least five prisoners of war were known to be still alive in September 2011, albeit surviving under dire conditions, renders Eritrean implementation of Security Council resolution 1862 (2009) and subsequent resolutions a matter of urgency.

133. It is therefore the assessment of the Monitoring Group that Eritrea's continuing denial that it holds Djiboutian prisoners of war and its refusal to provide information constitute obstruction of resolution 1862 (2009), and that those responsible should be considered for targeted measures under resolution 1907 (2009).

[53] Both men have since been promoted to the rank of sergeant.

VIII. Recommendations

Arms embargo

134. The Monitoring Group recommends that the Security Council consider requesting briefings from the Governments of Egypt, Eritrea, Israel and the Sudan on the issue of arms and human trafficking between the four countries, as well as an Arias formula briefing from non-governmental organizations with relevant expertise.

Extraterritorial collection of revenues

135. The Monitoring Group recommends that in light of new information provided by the Monitoring Group in the present report, the Security Council consider renewing its decision that Eritrea should cease using extortion, threats of violence, fraud and other illicit means to collect taxes outside of Eritrea from its nationals or other individuals of Eritrean descent, and remind Member States of their obligation under paragraph 11 of resolution 2023 (2011).

Mining revenues

136. The Monitoring Group recommends that either the Government of Eritrea should voluntarily subscribe to a transparent framework for the management of its mining revenues, or Member States should impose mandatory disclosure requirements on mining companies and correspondent banks handling Eritrean revenues.

Implementation of resolution 1862 (2009)

137. The Monitoring Group recommends that the Government of Eritrea should immediately provide, either to the Government of Qatar or to the International Committee of the Red Cross, all available information relating to the status of Djiboutian prisoners of war in its custody or Djiboutian military personnel reported missing in action following the hostilities of June 2008.

Annex 1

Support for armed groups in the region

Annex 1.1
Support for the Ogaden National Liberation Front and Oromo Liberation Front

Background

1. On 31 October 2011, a combined group of fighters from the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) clashed near Seejo, in central Somalia with local militia from Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a (ASWJ), a group nominally aligned with Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and supported by Ethiopia in its efforts to combat the Islamist extremist organization, Harakaat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin. The ONLF/OLF fighters were intercepted as they attempted to cross the border from Somalia into Ethiopia where they would join the ranks of their respective movements.[1]

2. After a brief series of skirmishes, 25 members of the ONLF/OLF group (5 ONLF and 18 OLF) were taken prisoner, while the remainder scattered into the bush. The Monitoring Group has the opportunity to interview the detainees over the course of several days in Jigjiga, eastern Ethiopia, in November 2011, as well as senior officials from both wings of the ONLF, ASWJ, and confidential Somali sources with direct knowledge of ONLF operations in Somalia. The Monitoring Group also inspected arms and ammunition carried by the ONLF/OLF fighters.

3. Both groups had been trained in Eritrea over extended periods and were familiar with various training camps and Eritrean training officers. The information they provided was consistent with testimonies of other members of armed groups trained in Eritrea interviewed by the Monitoring Group over the course of successive mandates.

Training in Eritrea

4. The ONLF group consisted of five fighters trained in Eritrea as unit commanders headed by Abdirahman Ahmed Olaad, an ONLF operation commander well known to other ONLF leaders and fighters interviewed by the Monitoring Group on separate occasions. Olaad told the Monitoring Group that he is a member of the Ogaden/Maxamed Subeer/Reer Isaaq clan who had joined the ONLF in 1998 at Dhagaxbuur. He was sent for training in Eritrea in 2007, together with approximately 100 other fighters, upon the instructions of the ONLF central Committee. Olaad travelled to Eritrea via Djibouti.

Kiloma training camp

5. At the Djibouti-Eritrea border, Olaad's cohort was received by Sheikh Deeq, a senior ONLF official, and placed under control over the Eritrean military. They were

[1] The clashes were reported in Somali media, for example: http://kismaayo24.com/?p=19592; http://www.camaloow.com/print.php?type=N&item_id=3984; http://shabelle.net/wararka/42-new-in-somali-content/2710-dagaal-culus-oo-ka-qarxay-degmada-cadaado-ee-gobolka-galgduud.

initially taken to Kiloma (near Asab) for training, where they encountered members of other armed groups including some from Djibouti (see Annex 1.1.a.).[2]

6. The ONLF had a separate camp at Kiloma where the cohort was divided into two groups. The initial instruction, consisting of basic combat training and leadership skills lasted almost three months and was conducted by Eritrean officers only, not ONLF. The Eritrean officers included:

- Colonel "Samuun": Camp Commander, who spoke and wrote notes in Amharic, so trainees required a translator;
- "Mengiste": Deputy Commander prepared and organized the training programme;
- Yosef: conducted practical training;
- Mehari: conducted practical training.

7. Other officers not directly responsible for the training course included:

- Colonel "Hasanaad": attended the ONLF graduation ceremony at Asab. He was described by the interviews as "a political commissar", but has also been previously identified to the Monitoring Group as a military intelligence officer named "Hatsaynet";[3]
- Colonel "Musa": ONLF trainees heard him spoken about, but did not see him. "Musa" has previously been identified to the Monitoring Group as Tewelde Habte Negash (a.k.a. Amanuel Kidane and Wadi Kidane);
- "Shifew" and "Abdikarim": ranks and responsibilities unknown.

'Een Training Camp

8. From Kiloma, selected ONLF trainees were taken to 'Een training camp (near the village of Shi'ib to the northwest of Massawa), where several hundred trainees from various armed groups were hosted in different clusters around the camp.[4] One of the other groups in the camp was an earlier cohort of 204 trainees from the ONLF, who subsequently deployed, via Somalia, as the '*Alanside* force.[5] The new ONLF trainees also encountered OLF fighters and heard the Tigrayan opposition group "Demhit" mentioned, but did not encounter them. They also learned that the Somali opposition groups Hisb'ul Islam and Al-Shabaab had previously trained at 'Een, but that this was no longer the case.

9. Training lasted roughly 7 months, and was conducted by a combination of Eritrean and ONLF officers, including:

- Colonel "Jamal": Camp Commander and reportedly a former Ethiopian military officer. Some Eritrean military defectors have identified him as Colonel Jamal Mohamed Ahmed, a senior instructor specialized in commando and Special Forces training, but the Monitoring Group has been unable to confirm this information.

---

[2] The Kiloma training facility is referred to extensively in the July 2011 Monitoring Group report (S/2011/433).

[3] S/2011/433, p. 72.

[4] Een is extensively referred to in the July 2011 Monitoring Group report (S/2011/433).

[5] See S/2011/433 Annex 8.3.

- "Ramadan": Deputy Commander.

10. Training at 'Een was focused on small unit leadership and included the following subjects:

- Operational planning;
- Civil affairs;
- Anti-tank weapons, including FAGOT;
- Mortars, including their use at night and in defensive roles;
- Anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.

11. There was not training on the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). According to Olaad, the ONLF used to have its own IED expert, named "Hamzi", who had been trained in Pakistan. "Hamzi" was reportedly killed fighting in Somalia against Ethiopian forces.

Deployment to Somalia

12. According to the five ONLF detainees, they left Eritrea in early September 2011, travelling by land to Khartoum. At the time of their departure from Eritrea, they identified the following senior ONLF leaders as being present in Eritrea:

- Mohamed Hassan Yusuf: responsible for training;
- Abdillahi Mohamed Osman: deputy for training. He had been part of a group of ONLF flown from Eritrea to Dhuusomareeb (Somalia) in 2005, and returned to Eritrea in 2007 as a trainer;[6]
- Abdillahi Mohamed Dhuule: member of the ONLF Central Committee; joined the ONLF in 1999 and travelled to Eritrea in 2007;
- Mohamed Hassan Yusuf: joined the ONLF in 2005 and travelled to Eritrea in 2007;
- Abdi Ahmed Abdi: travelled to Eritrea in 2007; member of the ONLF Central Committee.

13. From Khartoum, their onward travel was arranged by two ONLF facilitators, Mohamed Dayiib and Muhumed Xasan, whose contacts had been provided by the ONLF representative in Asmara, Feysal Dahir. The facilitators arranged for "go home" papers (repatriation letters in lieu of passport) to be issued in order for them to be permitted to fly to Mogadishu, transiting in Nairobi, Kenya. From Mogadishu, the five claim to have taken a minibus to Gaalka'yo, where they linked up with the OLF fighters.

14. However, an independent and reliable source with direct knowledge of ONLF logistical arrangements in Somalia, claims that a group of ONLF fighters deployed from Eritrea entered Somalia via Mareero, near Boosaaso, and travelled by land to Gaalka'yo, before clashing with ASWJ.[7]

[6] Abdillahi has reportedly since left Eritrea and is in Jigjiga, Ethiopia.

[7] Interview with Boosaaso businessman, 23 February 2012.

15. The Commander of the OLF force, Asad Jamal, confirmed to the Monitoring Group that his force had linked up with the ONLF in Gaalka'yo, having entered Somali by sea via Hobyo. He could not confirm, however, the route the ONLF fighters had taken.

16. Feysal Dahir had given the group the phone number to they should call upon arrival in Gaalka'yo. According to Olaad:

> The number belonged to Abdirahman, an ONLF member told us he was Bah Geeri, but we later learned he was Reer Isaaq. He was the same man who had organized the movements of the '*Alanside* force and had rented the vehicles in which they had travelled from the coast to Booraame.

17. A senior ONLF figure has separately identified the ONLF representative in Gaalka'yo to the Monitoring Group as Abdirahman Mohamed Hassan, a member of the Reer Isaaq sub clan of the Ogaden. Abdirahman Mohamed Hassan is a close associate and business partner of Mohamed Aydiid Jaama', the Deputy Chairman of the Boosaaso Chamber of Commerce. Aydiid has been identified by multiple sources as an arms dealer and facilitator who has long managed ONLF logistics from Boosaaso and was responsible, together with Abdirahman, for the transport of the '*Alanside* force.[8] The Monitoring Group has separately identified Mohamed Aydiid as the principal arms broker for Al-Shabaab forces in northeastern Somalia, and a former supplier of *Hisb'ul Islaam* as well.[9]

18. Abdirahman reportedly arranged for weapons and ammunition to be provided to the group in Gaalka'yo, and for transportation to take them to Godinlaabe, near Adaado, in central Somalia, which is Adaado is the capital of the "Himan iyo Heeb" regional authority.

Assault rifles and mines recovered from the ONLF/OLF fighters

[8] Interview with elder from Boosaaso, 11 November 2011; interviews with former ONLF leader 14-15 December 2011; interview with ONLF leader, 19 December 2011.

[9] Interview with mixed group of former ONLF leaders, operational commanders and fighters, 23 November 2011.

19. After one night at Godinlaabe, they departed in two vehicles for the Ethiopian border, but one of the vehicles was in bad condition and broke down soon after leaving the tarmac road, near a settlement named Balliga'ad. Some of the group then took the other vehicles to seek new transport from Guuri'eel, a town controlled by ASWJ.

20. En route to Guuri'eel, they were stopped by three 'technical' vehicles manned by ASWJ fighters from the Habar Gidir/Ayr clan, who detained them for questioning. When they did not return, the remainder of the group realised that there was a problem and started to head for the border, but were intercepted by ASWJ militia near Garasle. After an all-night pursuit, the ASWJ fighters eventually succeeded in cutting them off: four ONLF/OLF fighters were reportedly killed in the action, and the remainder captured.[10]

21. On 7 November 2011, the Vice Executive Chairman of ASWJ, Sheikh Ahmed Abdullahi "Ilka'ase" issued a statement condemning the "Himan iyo Heeb" administration for allowing the ONLF fighters to transit their territory into ASWJ controlled areas.[11]

[10] ASWJ leaders confirmed this incident in an interview with the Monitoring Group on 11 January 2012.

[11] Confidential agency security report, 9 November 2011.

Annex 1.1.a
Aerial view of Kiloma training camp and adjacent airstrip
(17 April 2006)

Annex 1.1.b
Aerial view of Harena training camp (17 November 2006)



Annex 1.1.c
Aerial view of Sawa training camp and military base
(11 February 2006)



Annex 2

Violations of the general and complete arms embargo

Annex 2.1
Aerial view of the military apron of Asmara airport

On 10 September 2009



On 11 April 2010



1. Sukhoi Su-27
2. Mig-29
3. Mi-17
4. Mi-35
5. Yak Y-12
6. Augusta-Bell 412
7. Aermacchi MB-339C
8. L-90TP Redigo

On 31 July 2010



On 31 January 2011



1. Sukhoi Su-27
2. Mig-29
3. Mi-17
4. Mi-35
5. Yak Y-12
6. Augusta-Bell 412
7. Aermacchi MB-339C
8. L-90TP Redigo

On 1 March 2012

1. Sukhoi Su-27
2. Mig-29
3. Mi-17
4. Mi-35
5. Yak Y-12
6. Augusta-Bell 412
7. Aermacchi MB-339C
8. L-90TP Redigo
9. Aero L-39 Albatros
10. Fleet of unidentified 1-2 seater, possibly Zlin Z 42 or similar model

Source: Google Earth Pro version 6.2.2.6613, accessed on 7 May 2012 at http://earth.google.com. GPS coordinates of Asmara military apron according to Google Earth Pro: Latitude 15°17'38.99"N / Longitude 38°55'10.50"E, information compiled with the kind assistance of Siemon Wezeman, Senior Researcher at the Arms Transfers Programme of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Annex 2.2
Trafficking of arms and people — testimonies

1. Of 1,300 testimonies, 61 were from Eritreans who identified the names of Rashaida smugglers. The following are sample testimonies that illustrate either links to Eritrean officials, arms trafficking and/or abuse at the hands of traffickers.

May 2012: Combined arms and human trafficking

2. I left the Israeli prison two weeks ago after spending two weeks in a camp in the Sinai. I was held there by two Bedouin smugglers called Mohamed and Mustafa.

3. I was in Shegara refugee camp in Sudan when they kidnapped me. I had only been in the refugee camp for two weeks. The ones who have been there longer don't fall for the trap.

4. Some Rashaida came into the camp saying: "Come quickly, come with us, there is work ..." A few of us followed them and suddenly they jumped on us and forced us into cars. There are Rashaida in both Eritrea and Sudan — there's really no border for them — and there are words the Rashaida speak that we all understand.

5. I was taken to a place in Kassala and held there. There were four guards — different ones every day. There was one guy controlling everything, the big boss, but I only saw him once and I didn't catch his name.

6. From there, we were taken to the border with Egypt. We were two cars with 15 people in each — we were stuff in together. There were Kalashnikovs, RPGS and grenades in both cars.

7. They put in as many weapons as they could fit around us and some in the boot [trunk] of the car. These weapons came with us all the way to Sinai. I don't know where they were from but they were very new. The Bedouin were armed with Kalashnikovs – sometimes they would fire them in the air while they were driving.

8. It was impossible to know how many weapons there are but I knew there were at least two RPGs because I saw the heads of them.

9. We switched cars two times on the way to Sinai. The first switch was a handover from the Rashaida to the Bedouin, after a two-day drive from Kassala. The second time we were delivered to Mustafa and Mohamed.

10. Then we were put in a big truck and the weapons followed us in another smaller car. We drove for two days and two nights then we met up again with the smaller car with the weapons and drove down a hill directly into Sinai.

11. We were held in the camp in the middle of a big open area in the desert. There was a compound of a few houses spread out that belonged to the smugglers.

12. Mustafa holds people in two places — I was in a camp with 60 others. I don't know how many people were in the other place but I know that 17 people who arrived at our camp were sent on there. All of us were from Eritrea. There was a house that we would call "the weapons house". We could see from our building men would walk into this house empty handed and leave with weapons.

13. I had to pay a fee to leave but only the regular smuggling fee $3,100. I was lucky. I heard that the people who were taken from our group were sold for a lot of money so they could be ransomed.

14. Mustafa is about 45 and Mohamed more like 40. They are very rich and have a lot of very new cars; Toyota pick-up trucks.

15. Mohamed only spoke Arabic but Mustafa could stutter a few words of Tigrinya. All of the rest of them only spoke Arabic. Except every two to three days a man called Abu Mohamed would come and try to buy people for around $20,000-$30,000. I think he would buy them for about that much and then hold them to ransom for $50,000. If they couldn't pay, they would take their organs.

16. The Eritreans who were there before us told us that the Bedouin had threatened them that they would be killed for their organs and that is what was happening to the others.

17. Abu Mohamed speaks Tigrinya. Sometimes he would speak to Mustafa in Tigrinya just so that we could understand the horrible things they were intending to do to us.

18. I left Sudan on 1 April 2012 and arrived in Israel on 1 May 2012.

March 2012: Abuse of hostages (1)

19. I am 22 years old and I am from the village of Digesa in Eritrea. I arrived to Israel on March 3, 2012 and was put in the Israeli prison. I was released from the Israeli prison on March 22, 2012.

20. I left Eritrea on April 2, 2011 to Adi Harish Refugee Camp (near May Aini Refugee Camp) in Ethiopia. In Eritrea, I was forcibly recruited to Sawa military training base against my will. I left the country illegally to escape these harsh conditions. If I am returned to Eritrea, they will imprison me, torture me, and maybe even kill me.

21. I stayed in Adi Harish for two months and then I went to Shagarab Refugee Camp in Sudan. I stayed in Shagarab for approximately 3 days and then I moved to Khartoum, Sudan. My plan was to stay and live in Khartoum in Sudan. Unfortunately, I only stayed in Khartoum for 2 months.

22. In August 2011, when I was working in cleaning in Khartoum, Sudanese of the Rashaida tribe kidnapped me from my workplace and brought me to Kassala in Sudan. I spent 2 weeks in Kassala, locked up and guarded. We were a group of 28 people, including 4 women. After two weeks, we were put in 2 pickup trucks. They told us that we had to pay 120,000 Nakfa (Eritrean currency) which equals 3,000 US dollars. They told me I had to pay this money in order to be taken to Israel and that this was the only option to be released from the kidnappers. Before this point, I had never even thought of going to Israel.

23. We were forced to travel 3 days with the Sudanese (Rashaida) smugglers. After 3 days, we were told to get out of the cars. One Rashaida smuggler with a weapon walked with us 20 minutes at night (to the other side of a hill) and we were met by Bedouin smugglers that took control of us from the Rashaida smugglers. We walked a few minutes and then we were forced to board 2 small boats, we travelled on the water for 3 hours. Each boat was guarded by one Bedouin smuggler and they had

one weapon. After 3 hours, we got off the boats and walked for a bit. We were told to wait under a mountain until cars came to get us. No cars came and we spent the night and the next day in this place guarded by the armed Bedouin smugglers.

24. During the evening hours of the next day, 2 pickup trucks picked us up and we drove for 3 hours. We were then transferred to one large truck that had a canvas back. We travelled for one day and one night and then were transferred to 2 pickup trucks. We were in the 2 pickup trucks for several hours and then we were transferred again to another large truck with a canvas back. We were on this truck for one day and one night.

25. After we came down from this truck, we were put in a room made from wood from trees. At 4 in the morning, 2 pickup trucks came and drove us for four hours. Each time we switched vehicles, the smugglers (who had weapons each time) changed. After four hours, we found ourselves in the house of the armed Bedouin who had been with the group in one of the pickup trucks for the last four hours.

26. We were held in a room with a garage door that came down and locked us inside. We stayed in this place for one night and in the morning they took us out of the house. We walked 50 meters from the house and they put us in a room that was underground. When I was walking, I saw many very nice houses around me, but this was the nicest house and it was the only one with two floors. We were that same group of 28 people (including 4 women) that had left Kassala, Sudan.

27. We were followed into the room by the armed smuggler as well as several armed men that were holding a big chain. They were 6 men all together that were guarding us. They shackled each of us and they covered our eyes. Each of the 6 smugglers had a plastic pipe filled with wood and iron. Since our eyes were covered, we never knew when we would be the one to be beaten. When they were beating us, they began to demand that we pay 30,000 US dollars.

28. Every day they would come to beat us with the plastic pipe with wood and iron inside it during the evening hours. During this time, I thought about that plastic pipe. It seemed that they wanted a way to hurt us very bad without killing us with one blow. By putting the wood or iron inside the plastic pipe they were more likely to keep us in serious pain, but still alive. However, we knew that repeated beatings with this special stick could kill us. During these 2 weeks, it was the same 6 men that would beat us. I heard the names Abu Abdallah, Yousef, John Sinai, Ahmed, Khaled, and Taleb. Abu Abdallah was the leader.

29. Abu Abdallah seems to be around 60 years old. He is skinny, has a noticeable gap between his two front teeth, and his back is a bit hunched.

30. During the day, we had one telephone that we were supposed to use in order to call and beg our friends and family for the money that would set us free. They would beat us while we were on the phone so that our families would hear us scream. After 2 weeks of this situation, Abu Abdallah came and told us about a discount. If we paid quickly, we could pay 25,000 dollars. But if we did not pay quickly, he would re-raise the price to 30,000 dollars.

31. They continued to beat us and with such a difficult situation, people began to pay the 25,000 dollars. Three of the women as well as four men were able to pay. After they paid, they were taken from the underground room. One of the men later called us in Sinai from the Israeli prison. He told us that one of the women had been

shot at the border. She was then caught along with another women by the Egyptian military. The other woman and the four men had made it into Israel and they were being held in the Israeli prison.

32. There was a two-week period of the beatings that no one else was able to pay. It was during these two weeks that they started to electrocute us in addition to the beatings. They would also burn plastic onto our bodies. Following this, five more people were able to pay and they were taken from the room.

33. And then another five came up with the money. I was one of these five that was able to pay. However, Abu Abdallah told us that he would not take us from the room until ten people had come up with the money. We were only five that had organized the money and the other eleven people did not have the money. Then one of the eleven people, a man in his early 20s by the name of Ukbankiel, died from the beatings and hunger.

34. The beatings of the 10 people that had not paid (or been killed) intensified to twice a day. After 2 months of these conditions, three more people were able to come up with the money, 2 men and the 1 remaining woman.

35. Abu Abdallah told us that he would take the 8 of us out of the house to Israel. The five of us that had paid initially were put in one car and the three that had just paid were put in a second car. I later found out that those in the second car were sold to another group of smugglers. To date, two have paid it into Israel (including the woman) and one is still in Sinai.

36. John Sinai drove the second car and we were guarded by another man with a weapon. After driving for five minutes, we were told to exit the car and we were forced into another underground room. There were already 2 Eritreans in the room that I had never seen before. They told us that they had been in this room for the past 7 months and were expected to pay 33,000 dollars. The two Eritreans were named Weldu and Eyob, they had already paid some money but not the full amount. The group of 5 included Awet (myself), Robiel, Goytom, Daniel, and Ahferom.

37. When we arrived, John Sinai entered the room and told us to forget that we had already paid 25,000 dollars and that we must pay an additional 15,000 dollars. After one month, another 11 men (9 Eritreans and 2 Ethiopians) joined us. These 11 were told to may 33,000 dollars, the ransom for the 5 of us was lowered to 10,000 dollars, and the two that had been there when we arrived still had to complete their initial payment.

38. John Sinai seems to be in his 30s. He is a bit fat and medium height. He is also about 1 meter 70 cm.

39. Later that night, another Eritrean entered the room, by the name of Welday Solomon. The smugglers called him Abdu and he was the translator for the smugglers. While he slept in the room with us, he would often sit with the smugglers and eat with them. He would beat us when the smugglers were there and even after the smugglers would leave, he would continue to beat us with the special stick.

40. Welday Solomon seems to be 27 years old, he is thick although not fat and not skinny. His hair is receding a bit and he is about 1 meter 70 cm. He usually has a full beard.

41. Welday Solomon was in charge of giving us the phone to call our families. He would tell our families that if we did not pay, he would kill us. The families began to stop answering the phone. He would also eat all the food given to the group and drink all of the water that was meant to be for everyone. He would bring the group his urine for them to drink. I have many scars on my hands and my head from this man.

42. While Welday Solomon was beating us, the Bedouin smugglers would continue to torture us as well. I was severely beaten, burned with plastic, and electrocuted. I was also cut up with a knife and have scars on my face and back from the wounds. During the last several weeks, John Sinai would taunt our group of five by saying that it did not matter if he killed us because he already made so much money from us.

43. There was one week where we were not given any food or water. We were only allowed to drink Welday Solomon's urine. During this week, Welday Solomon and John Sinai saw that three people, Robiel, Goytom, and Tsegay, were a bit stronger than the rest. These were three people from my group of five. In order to weaken them, they would hang them from the ceiling of the room and beat them. They would bring them down, give them some water, and hang them back up from the ceiling.

44. After three days of this treatment, Robiel died from his wounds. He was 21 years old. Two hours after he died, John Sinai and Welday Solomon removed his body from the room. We do not know what they did with the body.

45. One day later, after more beatings, Goytom died. Goytom was about 24 years old. They wrapped Goytom's body in a blanket and took him from the room.

46. After three more days of beatings, Tsegay, one of the Eritreans from the group of 11, died. As people kept dying, Welday Solomon would threaten that we would be next.

47. Two days later, Ahferom from my group died from the beatings.

48. After Ahferom died, Welday Solomon disappeared. He did not return. We were now able to eat the food that they brought us and we could drink some water.

49. When John Sinai would come to beat us, he would tell us that he had killed Welday Solomon. It was at this point that John Sinai hung me from the ceiling and increased the beatings against me.

50. After 3 months of being in this second underground room, experiencing this torture and watching my people die, I was able to put together 10,000 dollars and I paid this ransom.

51. I was taken with one other person from the group who had also paid to the Israeli border. We crossed into Israel.

52. The total ransom I paid in Sinai was 35,000 dollars and I spent 7 months in Sinai.

53. I left behind 9 people in that room. I still speak with them on the phone to give them encouragement. They told me that an additional 7 people have joined them. I also heard that Welday Solomon was not killed by John Sinai; but that he had escaped to Cairo, Egypt.

54. Below are pictures of the scars on my body from the torture that I endured in Sinai.





April 2012: Abuse of hostages (2)

55. I lived in Sudan for two years. A human trafficker promised to take me to Sinai for 3,000 dollars. We were 210 people who paid 3,000 dollars.

56. All of us were sold. We were divided into different houses. They told us that we were going to Israel and took us in groups of 10. 50 people were held in each house. We were divided in two rooms. We were taken by car and reached a house. As soon as we left the car, guards with guns started beating us. We were chained by our hands and legs. When we went to the place everybody thought that we were going to Israel, but instead we were put in houses.

57. At the beginning, we were forced to pay 40,000 dollars. We were burned. I was electrocuted. My back is burned. They tortured us because we said that we could not pay the 40,000 dollars. They told us that if we would not pay they would kill us. My hands are swollen. It took time until all of us paid. They were beating us every minute, it took time for our families to pay the money, the beatings continued.

58. I found it very difficult because I have no one in Israel. They were demanding a phone card to call my family. All the Bedouin guards were beating me, torturing me with electricity because I did not have money to pay for the telephone cards to call my family.

59. I never went out. I did not see the sun for 10 months. Sometimes they would blindfold us. I was beaten on my head and my face. They tried to give us drugs to smoke, but we refused. I was whipped, I have lashes all over my back. I was burned with plastic on my back. I have burn wounds all over my arm. My fingers are swollen, my nails are black because of the repeated beatings.

60. Five people died of the 29 people that stayed with us. 10 of us were girls. The five people that died were all boys. The other 24 left after 3 months or 6 months, I was the last one to leave. In the other part I think that there are people who are still left behind. There were new people brought every time. Some paid 40,000 dollars. Others paid 28,000 or 26,000, we paid different amounts of money. The five people died because of the beatings and the torture with electric. They were all young, except two that I think were my age. From the people who died some paid 12,000, 15,000 or 18,000.

61. The name of the trafficker is Abu Musa and his brother is called John Sinai. The children of the traffickers were beating us. Children from 10 to 17 years old were coming and they were beating us. Children were burning my legs. I was beaten in order to be a lesson for others.

62. Three people were hanged. They were hanged for ten days for the new people to see what they would do to him if they would not pay. Two people that were hanged with me died. My hands were almost to be separated. We were tortured while we were hanged from the ceiling.

63. After six days the others died. For ten days in a row I hanged there, no sleep, no food. When we were beaten they took drugs and went to sleep. The people that were with me raised me while they were sleeping so that I could sleep. We were tied up with iron. The chain was tied out of the roof so that they chain could not be opened or I could be released. The tip of my feet were near to the ground.

64. In order to give a lesson to new ones we were hanged like that. The two that were hanged with me were to young to bear all the hardship. I was in the army so I was able to survive the torture. I was beaten on the sole of my feet. I have trouble walking. Even now I cannot stand because of the hanging. I was not able to cross the border on my own. The people carried me across the border.

Photograph of informant's body and scars:

March 2012: Abuse of hostages (3)

65. "I was kidnapped when I was in Sudan in Hamdeid while I was crossing from Ethiopia. The people who helped me to cross the river handed me and 9 other people over to the Rashaida. We were kept in the forest for a week. From there we were sent straight to the Sinai.

66. When we reached in Sinai they asked us to pay US$ 3,000. After three weeks we paid. We were 27 people. When we paid we were changed to another room, there we were chained and blindfolded and asked another US$ 33,000. I do not know how many people were with me then. They told us that we were sold.

67. I was beaten on my ears. Pulse was coming from my ears. We were beaten with a piece of wood from a table. We were also tortured with electricity. They put the wire in my mouth, we had to hold it with our teeth. We were blindfolded all the time, I could only hear them.

68. We were hungry most of the time. Because of the beatings I have swollen legs. There were only two that were allowed to go and cross the border. It was difficult for me to cross the border. They told us that they were calling the doctor to take our kidneys.

69. There were women with children, I only heard their voices, I never saw them. I heard that people died, but I never saw them. In the beginning when they blindfolded us they told us that they would take of the blindfold, but they never did. For 60 days I was blindfolded.

70. They were beating us while we were talking with our relatives. The traffickers had different names. Sometimes he called himself Mohammed, at other times Khalid. He told us to tell the people that you are in the house of Mohammed, but his name is Khalid.

71. We were given little water, the little water that was given to us was with diesel. I do not know who paid for me, I know my parents cannot pay. We were taken by car for ten minutes to the border, in fifteen minutes walking we reached the border. I heard a plane moving. It looked like a forest, but not a city."

March 2011: Abuse of hostages (4)

72. "We were five people together from Eritrea. We were kidnapped as soon as we entered Sudan. We were taken to the desert. We were kept in Sudan and asked to pay more than US$ 2000 in order to be released to Khartoum. After we told the Rashaida that we don't have such amount of money we where taken to Sinai and immediately they asked us to pay US$ 33,000.

73. I was hanged upside down from the ceiling and was beaten. I was chained and we were tortured with electric. I was beaten on my productive organ. I was blindfolded for six months until I paid US$ 25,000. We were chained five by five persons. If you opened the blindfold they beat you. I only heard voices and the cries of the other people but I do not know who were with me. From the moment we entered we were blindfolded. The smugglers told us that people have died because they did not pay. I did not see them, but we were told. They were also torturing us with fire. The traffickers told me: Either you pay money or your body will be taken away. You will not go out alive if you do not pay. We were with Abu Ahmed and with the brother of Abu Musa, his name is John Sinai. We were beaten on our ears;

it is very difficult to concentrate and to remember what happened. I was beaten on my genitals. I cannot sleep during the night. My hand and feet pain me.

74. I do not know how my family paid. They begged everyone to pay. When I asked my family in Eritrea to pay 22000 they were in shock, they never thought they could pay that amount of money, they begged people to collect the ransom. I was carried across the border, I could not walk. Someone carried me across the border. I am staying with people. There was a shooting at the border, but everyone crossed."

2011: Involvement of Eritrean officials, including General "Manjus"

75. I have been in Israel for one year. I left Eritrea in 2003. In between, I was in Libya and Sudan. On my way to Israel in 2011, I spent 20 days in the Sinai. I worked as a translator for the smuggler Abu Ahmed.

76. Abu Ahmed is the boss of his family of smugglers. He brings people from Libya and Sudan to Israel and charges them $15,000 each, no more, no less.

77. He also smuggles weapons. The way he brings them is through Sudan but their journey starts in a place called Allai, in the highlands of Eritrea. From Allai they are taken to Tesseney, which is the exit town of Eritrea.

78. From Tesseney they go to Wadi Sharifay in Sudan, which used to be a refugee camp. From Wadi Sharifay to Sitau Ashrin; which is also a refugee camp.

79. There are two high ranking Eritrean soldiers involved in this, I know them well. Their names are Borhame and Yesef Hadegu. The main man who is in charge of all of this is Manjus. The other two are the ones working. They bring the weapons in their cars to Wadi Sharifay. Then Manjus calls the Rashaida and they come and there is a handover — the smugglers take the weapons. These are the same gangs that smuggle people. I know the name of one of them is Abed. They are very tight with the military.

80. Manjus gets all the money. They don't get anything. They are in the military so they just do what they are told.

81. They money doesn't stop with Manjus, it goes all the way up — to the president. The weapons are taken to Sinai. I saw with my own naked eyes, Abu Ahmed buy $250 each for these weapons. They are mostly Russian, originally. He then sells them to Palestinians for more. All the weapons are old, mostly Kalashnikovs and RPGs.

82. The weapons are taken in a big truck from Eritrea to Sudan. But when they are transported from Sudan to Sinai, they are covered with people so they are not exposed to the satellites.

83. The routes into Egypt come from all different directions but they all cross at exactly the same point on the Suez Canal. They carry the weapons in ships covered with cartons and bags so as not to be detected and people sit on them.

84. Abu Ahmed would receive deliveries of weapons three times a week. In every two deliveries, there would be say 300 weapons; and countless bullets.

85. I also met Abu Abdullah. He used to buy bullets from Abu Ahmed, so I suppose it's likely that he wasn't smuggling weapons himself. I think there were a few others who are.

86. Abu Ahmed's base is obvious. Really, I think those people [in the area] must not have any brains if they don't know it is there. He has four big houses.

87. There is also a deep underground grave. One day, Abu Ahmed's son Mohamed took us to that grave and said, "Many of your brothers are here. We will put you here too". If you took me in a helicopter, I could show you were this is easily. It's about 200 metres away from the houses and has a big wide opening.

2008: Alleged involvement of Eritrean General "Manjus"

88. I left Sudan in December 2007. Rashaida Arabs brought us through Sudan and then another tribe of Bedouin took us into the Sinai.

89. They drove white Toyota pickup trucks covered in mud to camouflage them, like soldiers. There were 22 of us per truck. They didn't speak in any Eritrean dialects just Arabic. But they have a big connection to Eritrea — the Rashaida in both countries speak the same language. I forgot the name of ours, but there is always a connection man who translates for the smugglers from Arabic into Tigrinya.

90. The connection man in our group told me they had brought weapons from Eritrea. He didn't tell me any of the details about where they were from exactly and how the Rashaida had got hold of them.

91. I don't know how many weapons there were in the car with me but it was full. They covered the weaponry with tent material and made us sit on them. There were RPGs, Kalashnikovs, machineguns.

92. We could only see what was on the top level of the weapons, it was difficult to see how many there were but there were a lot. There was Tigrinya script on the weapons that I saw. The initials of the soldier whose gun it was or of the battalion.

93. There were 17 cars in our convoy. Nine of the cars were travelling ahead of us carrying about 100 people. They reached the border with Egypt, they were stopped by Egyptian soldiers. The Rashaida took out the weapons, gave them to the Eritreans and made them fight the soldiers. Three Eritreans were killed and two Egyptian soldiers. The rest of the Eritreans were captured.

94. The smugglers keep in constant contact with each other and the first group called back to say what had happened. We were lucky. We didn't see any soldiers when we crossed. I'm not sure where we were on the border but there was a huge mountain.

95. There was no highway to drive along in Sudan, we just drove on the sand through the desert all the way from Khartoum to Egypt. When we got into Egypt, we drove on a highway all the way to the Suez Canal.

96. We were smuggled onto a boat with the weapons and with the help of a very senior Egyptian general. I saw him but didn't speak to him and never found out his name but he was very high ranking. The smuggler's agent was the only man who would speak with me.

97. I understand a bit of Arabic though and I overheard the Bedouin saying that the weapons were going to the Palestinians. The last time I saw the weapons was after the channel crossing. We went onto Cairo and I don't know where the weapons went next.

98. I don't know how the process works exactly but I know that one of the senior military officials in Eritrea, Teklai Manjus, gathered all the Rashaida together and told them that wherever they are in the world, they will be Eritreans. The Rashaida have very good contacts with the military but they don't care about nationality or patriotism. They only care about making money.

Annex 3

Revenue collection outside Eritrea

Annex 3.1
Eritrean extraterritorial revenue collection

Overview

1. In order to assess the methods employed by the Eritrean government and PFDJ to collect extraterritorial revenue, the Monitoring Group conducted forty-two interviews with members of the Eritrean diaspora in East Africa, the Middle East, Europe and North America. However, because of fear of retribution by the Eritrean authorities, nearly all requested anonymity. Since neither the Government of Eritrea nor the PFDJ distinguish between Eritrean nationals resident abroad and foreign nationals of Eritrean descent, the terms "Eritrean" and "Eritrean diaspora" in the context of this annex refer to both categories.

Enforcement measures

2. The most common of enforcement is for Eritrean tax collectors to demand retroactive payment in full as a precondition for the provision of any consular service. Other enforcement measures vary from country to country. The cases studies below are not limited exclusively to those countries from which the examples have been drawn:

Power of attorney (United States)

3. In the United States, for example, Eritrean tax collectors have long required individuals to provide a copy of a completed Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Tax Return Form in order to estimate level and period of income, with retroactive effect. However, many Eritreans either resent the tax or resist it because of their dual tax obligations and therefore underreported their income. When tax agents realized that many declarations were untrue or forged, they adapted their approach, taking the extraordinary step of demanding signed release statements (the equivalent of a power of attorney) in order to allow them to directly access personal tax returns form from the IRS.[1]

Denial of service (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)

4. Saudi Arabia is a key centre of tax revenue for Eritrea. The number of Eritrean workers in Saudi Arabia is estimated at 300,000; if only 200,000 of these workers paid USD$ 200 in diaspora taxes (a conservative estimate), the total revenue would be US$ 40 million per year.

5. The Saudi authorities strictly control residence permits, providing them only if the applicant possesses a valid passport with a minimum of six months validity. Prior to 2010, the Eritrean embassy in Saudi Arabia would deliver passports valid for three years. In 2011, passport validity was reduced to every two years, meaning that Eritrean must visit their Embassy every other year and pay taxes, or they will not legally be able to remain in the Kingdom.

[1] Interview, 1 March 2012.

6. An Eritrean formerly resident in Saudi Arabia, "O", told the Monitoring Group how he had returned there to marry an Eritrean national. After the wedding, O took his new spouse to the Eritrean Embassy in Riyadh to receive her new passport and was required to pay 2 per cent of his income, which amounted to 700 Riyals (approximately US$ 200).

7. Whilst in Saudi Arabia, "O" wanted to send a parcel of food and gifts to his relatives in Eritrea, a common custom among members of the Eritrean diaspora. The private shipping company he paid to deliver the package would not accept to place his order unless he first presented proof of payment of the 2 per cent tax. They explained that this obligation was imposed upon them by the Eritrean authorities.

"Regret Letters" (Sweden)

8. In May 2011, two Eritrean opposition activists resident in Sweden, Ms. Meron Estefanos and Mr. Ephraim Tewelde visited the Eritrean Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden in order to document the process of applying for a new passport and national identity card.[2] Using a concealed camera and microphone, Ephraim recorded their exchanges with the Embassy staff of Eritrea. Extracts from this video footage were aired on Swedish television programme focusing on a number of contentious Swedish-Eritrean issues.[3]

9. As a first step, Ephraim was instructed to complete an "Immigration and Citizenship Services Request Form", also known as a "regret letter" (see Annex 3.1.a.). Ephraim initially refused to sign, arguing that he had in fact left Eritrea legally, having declared himself as a student in South Africa for seven years. However, the Embassy official told him that since he did not return to Eritrea upon completion of his studies, Ephraim was now considered "illegal", and as a result was required to complete and sign the "regret letter".

10. Ephraim was also told that payment of the 2 per cent tax was a precondition for the provision of any other service, and that he would only be issued with his documents after the Embassy had first verified his tax declaration with the Swedish tax agency.

11. Ephraim was then introduced to an individual known as "Jemal" or "Jimmy" — reportedly a well-known figure within the Eritrean diaspora in Sweden for his role in collection of the 2 per cent tax. When Ephraim expressed concern over the amount of tax he would be required to pay, "Jimmy" replied: "We will make it like a Gurage deal [...] The important thing is the 'B4' [form] so you can't hide from us."[4]

[2] Interview with Ms. Meron Estefanos and Ephraim Tewelde, Stockholm, Sweden, 17 January 2012.

[3] Documentary film "Fången", trailer aired on SVT, Swedish state television, 18 September 2011. http://svt.se/2.149941/1.2531035/fangen_-_dawit_isaak_och_tystnaden. For a complete part 4 of the programme, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rmu2dhngCkI.

[4] Ms. Estefanos told the Monitoring Group that the term 'Gurage' referred to Ethiopian community reputed for their bargaining skills, meaning that the amount of tax to be paid was negotiable.

Denial of family reunion: case 1

12. In 1995, Ms. "N", the mother of three children, left Eritrea for Sudan, alone and for personal reasons.[5] She then travelled to Ethiopia and arrived in Europe in 2006. In 2008, "N" sought to bring in her three sons to join her in Europe and initiated the reunion process via the Eritrean Embassy in her new home country.

13. Although "N" was a beneficiary of social welfare, the Eritrean embassy official nevertheless insisted that she pay 2 per cent of her income in taxes retroactively: approximately US$ 680. He added that reunification with her children was not a valid argument for waiver of the tax; in paying she was only fulfilling her duties as an Eritrean and should not expect special treatment. According to "N", another Embassy employee added: "It is you who is in need of us. If you don't like it, you can leave." Since "N" could not afford to pay the tax, she left.

14. In June 2010, one of "N's" sons decided to depart Eritrea using a smuggler's network, which took him across the border into Sudan. On the road the vehicle was stopped and passengers were robbed. When "N's" son tried to escape, he was fatally shot.

15. Several weeks later, the mother of "N" passed away in Eritrea and her relatives put her house up for sale. "N" was told by the Embassy that since her remaining son was still a minor, she needed to establish a "Power of Attorney" in the name of a family member, in order for her last child to receive his share of the proceeds (see Annex 3.1.b.). To obtain the "Power of Attorney" she was obliged to pay the 2 per cent tax, now verbally estimated by the Embassy official at over US$ 800. "N" negotiated and eventually paid about US$ 500. When she complained, she was told: "All other Eritreans on welfare are paying without complaint."

Denial of family reunion: case 2

16. In 2003, Mr. S., a former EPLF combatant and teacher in the Eritrean administration, left Eritrea alone for Sudan where he registered as a refugee.[6] He subsequently travelled to Italy and then onward to a final country in Europe, where he was granted asylum. In 2006, 'S' requested the Eritrean Embassy to allow a family reunion with his wife and their only child. He was told to pay the diaspora tax with an eight-year retroactive effect, but refused.

17. In 2007, "S" was granted permanent residence and renewed his request that his wife and child be allowed to rejoin him. Eritrean embassy officials then demanded that, in addition to the 2 per cent tax, he also sign a "regret letter", which he refused to do.

18. In mid-2011, "S" managed for his wife and child to travel to Sudan, and from there to Europe where they joined at the end of the same year.

Denial of family reunion: case 3

19. After a long career of key posts within EPLF and PFDJ, Mr. Z. Mr. Z. was among those high-ranking EPLF and PFDJ members who objected to President Issaias Aferworki's plans to stay in power without the implementation of the

[5] Interviews, 18 January and 12 May 2012.

[6] Interview, 2 May 2012.

proposed Eritrean Constitution. Facing probable arrest and detention, "Z" fled to Europe, leaving behind his wife and child.

20. When "Z" own status in Europe had stabilized, he informally approached Eritrean officials who told him that they could do nothing for his family unless he was willing to publicly declare that he had illegally left the country, sign the regret letter, and pay 2 per cent tax. "Z" refused.

21. Z's wife subsequently fled with her child to Sudan at considerable risk. The family was reunited in late 2011.

Private enterprise and the repudiation of relatives: case 1

22. Mr. "K" left Eritrea in 2000 and established himself in the UK.[7] In 2007, the business licence of his parents' import-export company in Asmara expired. When the family applied to renew their business licence, the authorities in Asmara stipulated that in order to obtain approval, their son needed to acquit himself of the 2 per cent diaspora tax payment.

23. When his family contacted Mr. K. he replied that he did not want to pay and his parents renounced him as a member of his family in order to obtain the license, creating a longstanding rift in the family.

Private enterprise and the repudiation of relatives: case 2

24. Ms. E fled Eritrea in January 2010 and became a resident in the United Kingdom.[8] On 22 November 2011, family members still residing in Asmara called and asked her to contact the Eritrean Embassy in her new home country and voluntarily offer to pay the 2 per cent tax on her current income. They made clear that, should she refuse, they would be denied the authorisation to exploit a very profitable business closely associated with government enterprises.

25. "E" refused to pay, citing her new status in the host country and the challenges she faced in starting a new life. In order to obtain government approval for the family business, her mother in Asmara was required to sign a document repudiating her daughter. Since that date they have not been in contact.

Denial of exit from Eritrea (dual nationals)

26. In October 2011, Ms. "E", a US citizen of Eritrean descent, travelled to Asmara to visit her relatives, although she had refused to pay the diaspora tax to a PFDJ agent in her country.[9] Shortly before her return flight to Europe, Eritrean officials informed "E" that she would have to pay her outstanding diaspora tax in order to obtain an exit visa. Multiple bureaucratic obstacles in determining the amount to be paid and the payment procedure resulted in such lengthy delays that Ms. E. missed her return flight to the U.S. and had to purchase new air tickets.

27. In 2011, an elderly woman resident in Europe, Mrs. "B" "wanted to visit Eritrea one last time." Because 'B' survives on a state welfare programme, a PFDJ tax collector agreed that she could travel to Eritrea if she paid just 1 per cent tax on her monthly welfare allowance. Since the tax requirement was retroactive, this

[7] Interview, 22 April 2012.

[8] Interview, Zurich, Switzerland, 20 March 2012.

[9] Interview, Seattle, Wa., U.S., 28 March 2012.

represented a significant unplanned expenditure, but she agreed and was permitted to travel.

28. Months later, as "B" prepared to return from Eritrea to her country of residence, government officials who refused to identify themselves stopped her at the airport and demanded payment of what they claimed was the remaining 1 per cent tax due. When she convinced them that she was nearly completely destitute of any financial means, she was told to leave behind Eritrean goods — offered to her by her relatives — she had been planning to bring back with her.

Mandatory contributions to the Eritrean defence budget

Canada

29. In Canada, UN Security Council resolution 1907 (2009) was translated into domestic legislation as "Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolution on Eritrea", 22 April 2010. The law prohibits any person to knowingly provide or transfer, directly or indirectly, technical or financial assistance related to military activities in Eritrea.[10]

30. Nevertheless, the 2 per cent tax form, provided by the Eritrean Consulate in Toronto, includes a distinct column for "donations to national defence against Ethiopian invasion" are expected (see Annex 3.1.c.). The column is divided into several sections corresponding to a time line indicating for which period of the Eritrean conflicts with Ethiopia the applicant is expected to pay.

31. Testimonies recorded by the Monitoring Group describe tax collectors calculating the total 2 per cent tax due, before adding "donations" to the Defence budget. If applicants agree to pay the 2 per cent tax, but refuse a contribution to the Eritrean defence budget, they can be still denied consular services.

32. In 2011, Mr. "W" was required to present a valid passport in order to obtain permanent residence status in Canada. He therefore approached the Eritrean Consulate in Toronto for renewal of his passport. According to a statement, provided by 'W' to an Eritrean 'community leader' whom he subsequently approached for assistance:

> The Eritrean tax collector calculated the amount the person had to pay, including a "donation for the Eritrean defence fund". Although "W" was willing to pay the 2 per cent, but not the money for defence budget, the Consulate official declared that he would not renew the passport. When "W" asked the Consulate official to provide him with a written notice confirming this Eritrean obligation, the official replied: "it is not in our culture".[11]

33. "W" pleaded with Canadian Immigration officials that fundraising for the benefit of Eritrean defence forces violates UN Security Council resolutions and Canadian laws, but they insisted that 'W' provide a valid passport in order to obtain permanent resident status in Canada. 'W' had no choice but to pay the entire sum requested by the Eritrean Consulate in order to secure his stay in Canada.

[10] http://canadagazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2010/2010-05-12/html/sor-dors84-eng.html.

[11] Interviews, May and 11 June 2012.

Sweden/Italy

34. In 2011, since "N" wished to obtain a Power of Attorney document from the Eritrean Embassy to Sweden, and was referred to "Jimmy" (see para 11 above). Since "N" was unemployed, he attempted to convince "Jimmy" that he could not afford to pay over US$ 5,000 in tax arrears plus US$ 75 for Power of Attorney documents (see Annex 3.1.d.).

35. After some deliberation on the issue, 'N' was eventually informed by another Eritrean diplomat that because he had never contributed to the "National Defence Pledge", he would be obliged to do so. "The 2% tax is always negotiable, but not the 'Defence Pledge.' It's a national matter, and all nationals should pay." He eventually paid the total amount in order to obtain the Power of Attorney documents we required.

Illicit means and fraud

36. A PFDJ fundraising drive in Canada in early 2012 falsely presented itself as a campaign to assist Eritreans orphans and children, in potential violation of Canadian law. An RCMP report notes:

> On 18 February 2012 in Calgary, PFDJ agents organised a concert with a musical group whose members are alleged by the complainant to be members of the EPLF (Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front). The group is also alleged to have been organized and sponsored by Eritrean diplomats based in Washington, D.C., and Ottawa, Canada. The group came to Canada ostensibly to fund-raise for orphans and other children in Eritrea, and the organizers admit that the funds raised were to be turned over to representatives of the Eritrean government. PFDJ organizations that reportedly host fund raising events are not registered organizations/charities.

37. In Seattle, Washington (U.S.A.), multiples sources have told the Monitoring Group that the "Eritrean Association" community centre in is totally controlled by members of the PFDJ, and serves as the main venue for PFDJ fund raising. Non-PFDJ members, including some former members of the Eritrean Association have been excluded from the centre, which is reportedly financed in large part by the Seattle City Council.[12]

[12] Interviews of Eritrean community members in Seattle, 27 March 2012.

Annex 3.1.a
Power of attorney form and certified translation[1]

ውክልላ ቆንስል ሃገረ ኤርትራ
ቶሮንቶ - ካናዳ

القنصلية العامة لدولة إريتريا
تورنتو، كندا

CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ERITREA
TORONTO, CANADA

ዕለት: ____/____/____
ቁጽሪ መዝገብ: _____

ዕላሊ

ሰነድ ውክልና

እኔ _____ ዜግነት: _____
ስም አቦ ፓስፖርት: _____ ቁ. ፓስፖርት: _____
ዝተዋህበሉ ዕለት: _____ ዝወድኞ ዕለት: _____
ቁ. ኤር/መንነት: _____ ዕለት ሊደቅ: _____ ፆታ: _____
አውራጃ: _____ ንኡውራጃ: _____ ከተማ/ዓዲ: _____ ስልኪ (ኽ): _____
ዝኣመ አድራሻይ: _____

ብኽኢ ብደልየ ፈቓደኛ ምሉእ አእምሮኤን አብ ቅድሚ ኣብዚ ፈጸምኒ/ት ዘለ ደንፈት ሓንሳእ ሃገር ኤርትራ አብ ካናዳ ቶሮበ ገኒተ/መደበር ፈቀደ/ደት፡

_____

ከተማ: _____ ዕለት: _____ ፈጸመ: _____

በቕ ጽንፈት ኤምባሲ ኤርትራ ኣብ ካናዳ
እዚ አብ ዓለኺ ተጠቒሱ ዘሎ ውክልና ዕለማን፡ ውህሊት አብ ቤት ጽሕፈት ተረፀ/ባ ከም ዝፈረመ/ት የረጋገጽ ቅሕዘቶ ናይ ውክልና ሓላፍነቱ ወኪሉ/ት እየ፡

ስምን ከታናን በሻፊ ሞዛ፡ _____

ኣብኣይ፡
1. ንሕሱ ተናጥሳ ወይ ሞቶንር ቅብጽ ክምስክዓ ንሕብር።
2. እዚ ውክልናኒ አብ መሬኪ ናይ አየርኢ አብ ግርጌ ግሊኣ ተፈሊ ተፈሊ ወይኢ ኣርታዕ ክኣተ።

317-120 Carlton St. Toronto, ON M5A 4K2 Tel: (416) 306-2865, Fax: (416)306-2866

[1] Document translated provided by Elsa Chylum, Human Rights activist, phone and e-mail communications, 5 June 2012.

Emblem of the State of Eritrea

Consul General of the State of Eritrea

Toronto - Canada

(in Tigrinya and Arabic on either side)

.....

Date .....

Document No. .....

Legal Representation Form

Photograph

I ..... Nationality .....

Name on Passport ..... Passport No. .....

Type of Passport ..... Date Issued ..... Expiration Date .....

Eritrean ID No. ..... Date of Birth ..... Country .....

Province ..... District ..... City/Village ..... Home Phone No. .....

Current Address .....

Being of sound mind and in the presence of an official representative of the Consular of the State of Eritrea in Canada, it is my desire to appoint

Mr/Mrs/Miss

.....

.....

.....

.....

City ..... Date ..... Signature .....

Embassy of the State of Eritrea in Canada

The above mentioned has, with their signature, confirmed the legal representation of the representative. The authority now remains with the representative.

Name and Signature of Officer

.....

Information:

1. It is not permissible to delete or change

2. This representation has to be confirmed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within 6 months.

.....

317-120 Carlton St., Toronto, ON M5A 4K2 Tel: (416) 306-2865; Fax: (416) 306-2866

Annex 3.1.b
Immigration and Citizenship Services request form

B4/4.2

ፎርም መሕትት ኢሚገረሽናውን ዜግነታውን ኣገልግሎት

1. ምሉእ ስም _____ ጾታ_____
2. ምሉእ ስም ከም ፓስፖርት_____
3. መበቆል ዓዲ _____ 4. ዕለት ልደት_____
5. ቀጽሪ ኤርትራዊ ወ. መንነት _____ ዝተዋህበሉ ቦታ_____
6. ስም ኣደ _____
7. ካብ ሃገር ቅድሚ ምውጻእካ/ኪ ዝነበርካሉ ኣሃዱ/ሰራሕ _____
8. ካብ ሃገር ዝወጸእካሉ/ክሉ ምኽንያት _____
9. ካብ ሃገር ንምውጻእ ዝተጠቐምካሉ/ክሉ ቦታ/ጾብ _____
10. ዝወጸእካሉ/ክሉ ዕለት _____
11. ደሓሪ ካብ ኤርትራ ምውጻእካ/ኪ ዝነበርካቹ/ኪዮ ሃገራት ብብዕለቱ _____
12. ናብ ዝተጠቕሰ ሃገር ንኽትኣቱ/ትዊ ዝተጠቐምካሉ/ክሉ ሰነድ መገሺ እንተልዩ ናይ መን ሃገር'ዩ? _____
13. ሕጂ ኣብ ዘለኻኹ/ኺኹ ሃገር ዘለካ/ኪ ሰራሕ _____
14. ህልው ኣድራሻ: ሃገር _____ ከተማ _____
15. ካብ ሃገር ደሓሪ ምውጻእካ/ኪ ዝፈጸምካዮ/ኪዮ ሃገራዊ ንቡኣት _____

ኣነ ስመይ ኣብ ላዕሊ ተጠቒሱ ዘሎ ዚጋ ከሉ ኣቐዲመ ዝሃብኩዎ ሓበረታ ቅንዕ ምኺኑን ሃገራዊ ንቡኣይ ብዘይምምላእ ብዝፈጸምኩዎ በደል ተጣዒሰ ዝኩእ መቅጻዕቲ ኣብ ዝተወሰነሉይ ክኽበል ፍቓደኛ ምኺነይ ብስታመይ የረጋግጸ።

ክታሃ _____ ዕለት _____

ንበዓል መዚ ዝምልከት

ርእይቶ ዝሃመልኪቶ በዓል መዚ

_____

_____

_____

_____

በዚ ክታሙ ብዓል መዚ _____ ዕለት _____

ቆንስላዊ ቢ/ጽ:ሃገር _____ ከተማ _____

NB. ምድምሳስ/ ምስራዝ ቅቡል ኣይኮነን።

Immigration and Citizenship Services Request Form

1. Full Name ..... Gender .....
2. Full Name as shown in Passport .....
3. Village of origin ..... 4. Date of Birth .....
5. Eritrean ID No. ..... Issued at .....
6. Mother's Name .....
7. Unit/Work you had before you left the country .....
8. Reason you left the country .....

.....

9. Place/Border used to leave the country .....
10. Date you left .....
11. Countries you have been after you left the country and the dates you entered these countries

.....

12. Whose country entry documents did you use to enter these countries?

.....

13. Your job in the current country of residence

.....

14. Current address: Country ..... City .....
15. National obligations fulfilled after you left the country .....

.....

I, whose name is written above, confirm that previously given personal information is true; and that I regret having committed an offence by not completing the national service and am ready to accept appropriate punishment in due course.

Signature ..... Date .....

For Official Use

Officer's Comment

.....

.....

.....

.....

Name and Signature of Official ..... Date .....

Consular Office/Country ..... City .....

NB. Deleting or striking through not permitted.

Annex 3.1.c
Two per cent form with defence contribution[1]

ጠቅላሊ ቆንስል ሃገረ ኤርትራ
ቶሮንቶ - ካናዳ

القنصلية العامة لدولة إريتريا
تورنتو، كندا

CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ERITREA
TORONTO, CANADA

317-120 Carlton St. Toronto, Ontario, M5A 4K2 Tel: (416) 416-306-2865, Fax: (416-306-2876)

Date: ዕለት 2010 ቀ መዝገብ Ottawa- 2010

መረጋገጺ ናይ ዝተኸፍለ ግቡኣት (Clearance)

መረጋገጺ እቶት	ተረጋጊጹ	ተረጋጊጹ ☐
ምሉእ ስም (ምስ ናይ ኣብሓት)		ቀ ኤምንት
ስም (ኣብ ፓሰፖርት ካልእ ደኩመንት)		ቀ ኤፓስፖርት
ኣድራሻ		ቀ ስልኪ

መኣመኒ ግብሪ 2 % ብምስሪት ወሊ ምህላዎ ንገር
ኣቀጅ ቀ 17/1981 ኣቀጅ ቀ 6/7/1995 ኣንጻር ወራር መን

ንኻ	ብሊየ	ብዲናል		ነፍ መድረኽ
1982	00.00	ግሽተ ሽምንተ ሺሕ ኽኢ	(ብሊየ)	00.00
1983	000	ሰሮን ኣርባዕተን ሺሕ ኽኢ	(ብዲናል)	" " " "
1984	000	ሰሳን ሽድሽተን ሺሕ ኽኢ		
1985	00	" " " "		2ፍ መድረኽ
1986	00	" " " "	(ብሊየ)	00.00
1987	00	" " " "	(ብዲናል)	" " " "
1988	00	" " " "		
1989	00	" " " "		3ፍ መድረኽ
2000	000	ኣርማን ሽሞንተን ሺሕ ኽኢ	(ብሊየ)	00.00
2001	00	ሰሰሰተ ሚእቲ ሺሕ ኽኢ	(ብዲናል)	" " " "
2002	00	ሰላ ጾኒ ካናዳ		
2003	00	ሰላ ጾኒ ካናዳ		
2004	00	ሰላ ጾኒ ካናዳ	(ብሊየ)	00
2005	00	ሰላ ጾኒ ካናዳ	(ብዲናል)	
2006	00	ሰላ ጾኒ ካናዳ		
2007	00	ሰላ ጾኒ ካናዳ		
2008	00	ሰላ ጾኒ ካናዳ		
2009	00	ኣይ ሚእትን ሰሮን ጾኒ ካናዳ		
2010				
ተመሳኺ ሓቢራ		ካብ ሰማን ናብ ካናዳ		

መተሓሳሰቢ፡ 1. ዝኾነ ምድምዳም ነዚ መድቢ ዘይትኮል ይኸውር።
2. ነዚ መድቢ ዘይሓዘ ዜጋ ኣብ ኤርትራ ሃኞነ ዓይነት ኣገልግሎት ክረክብ ኣየኽእልን።

ስምን ኪታምን ፋይናንስ

Ahmed Iman
Head, Consular Affairs

[1] Document received from Eritrean Community Center (Canada); via third party.

LOGO

CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ERITREA
TORONTO, CANADA
2% TAX FORM

317-120 Carlton St. Toronto, Ontario, M5A 4K2 tel: (416)306-2865 Fax: 416-306-2866

Date: [redacted]/2010 **File Number: Ottawa-**[redacted]/2010

CLEARANCE

Proof of Income

Full Name along with grandfather's:

Name as in passport and other document Eritrean **ID Card:**

Address: **Phone Number:**

Recovery tax 2% according to Proc. 17/1991, Proc. 67/1195

Year	In Numbers	In Alphabets	Donation to national Defense against Ethiopian invasion
1992	[redacted].000	[redacted] thousand	1st Stage 00.00
1993	[redacted].000	[redacted] thousand	
1994	[redacted].000	[redacted] thousand	
1995	.00		
1996	.00		2nd Stage 00.00
1997	.00		
1998	.00		
1999	.00		
2000	[redacted].00	[redacted] thousand	3rd Stage 00.00
2001	[redacted].00	[redacted] thousand	
2002	[redacted].00 $	[redacted] Canadian dollars	
2003	[redacted].00 $	[redacted] Canadian dollars	
2004	[redacted].00 $	[redacted] Canadian dollars	
2005	[redacted].00 $	[redacted] Canadian dollars	
2006	[redacted].00 $	[redacted] Canadian dollars	
2007	[redacted].00 $	[redacted] Canadian dollars	
2008	[redacted].00 $	[redacted] Canadian dollars	
2009	[redacted].00 $	[redacted] Canadian dollars	**For Defense (donation)**
2010	--		**[redacted].00 ([redacted] hundred [redacted] dollars Canadian dollars.)**

Additional information: He came to Canada from Sudan in [redacted] given by Eritrean embassy in Khartoum [redacted]

Notification :-

1. We notify you any kind of erasure is not acceptable.
2. We inform you beforehand that no services will be rendered for a person who enters without this document.

Name AND Signature of the Finance
Amaresh Mebrahtu
Financial Officer

Name and signature of the Head
Ahmed Iman, Head of Consular Affairs
Stamp (Office of the Embassy of Eritrea)

Annex 3.1.d
Tax and duties payment receipt



ሃገረ ኤርትራ
ሚኒስትሪ ፋይናንስ

دولة ارتريا
وزارة المالية

Custoiner Copy

THE STATE OF ERITREA
Ministry of Finance

Customer Copy

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign Mission - Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 441 71 70

Tax and Duties Payment Receipt

Receipt No.: 0[redacted] Date: [redacted]-nov-20[redacted]

ID Number: 0[redacted] Payment Method: Bank

Name: [redacted]

Description: [redacted] [redacted]/[redacted]/20[redacted]

Item Code	Description	Amount ([redacted])
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted],00
220114	Charges for official copies of document	[redacted],00
260199	Other miscellaneous receipts not classi	[redacted],00
		[redacted],00

Amount in Words: [redacted] hundred [redacted] and Zero [redacted]

Name: [redacted]

Signature: [redacted]

ሃገረ ኤርትራ
ሚኒስትሪ ፋይናንስ

دولة ارتريا
وزارة المالية

Customer Copy

THE STATE OF ERITREA
Ministry of Finance

Customer Copy

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign Mission - Sweden
Telephone +46 8 441 71 70

Tax and Duties Payment Receipt

Receipt No: 0[redacted] Date: [redacted]-okt-20[redacted]

ID Number: 0[redacted] Payment Method: Bank

Name: [redacted]

Description: [redacted] [redacted]/[redacted]/20[redacted]

Item Code	Description	Amount [redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted],00
220112	Charges for clearance and other police	[redacted],00
260199	Other miscellaneous receipts not classi	[redacted],00
		[redacted],00

Amount in Words: [redacted] thousand [redacted] hundred [redacted] and Zero [redacted]

Name: [redacted]

Signature: [redacted]

Note: *The receipt is prepared in coloured three copies. The first copy to the payee, the second copy to the accounts and the third copy remains in the computer.*

To use white paper as a receipt is forbidden.

Annex 4

Acts that obstruct the implementation of resolution 1862 (2009)

Annex 4.1
Escape from Eritrea of Djiboutian prisoners of war

Background

1. On 10 June 2008, fighting broke out at Ras Doumeira, on the border between Djibouti and Eritrea, between the armed forces of the two states. According to the Government of Djibouti, the border clashes left 30 Djiboutian soldiers dead, 39 injured and 49 handicapped. Nineteen Djiboutian military personnel, including one officer, were reported missing in action and are presumed by the Djiboutian authorities to have been taken as prisoners of war (POWs) by the Eritrean authorities.

2. To date, the Government of Eritrea has denied holding any Djiboutian POWs, and has refused to provide information to any third party that could clarify the status of those Djiboutian military personnel missing in action.

3. On 16 September 2011, two men approached Sudanese police at the town of Karuurah on the Eritrean-Sudanese border and announced themselves as Privates First Class Ahmed 'Eeleeye Yabeh and Kadir Soumboul Ali of the Djiboutian Armed Forces. They claimed to have been held prisoner in Eritrea for more than three years and three months, and to have escaped from detention 11 days before.

4. The Monitoring Group interviewed the two men on 8 January 2012, and had the opportunity to obtain additional information concerning their case from the Djiboutian authorities.[1] Their identities, their disappearance on 10 June 2008 and their three-year absence are matters of historical fact and public record (see Annexes 4.1.a. and 4.1.b.).

Capture and initial treatment

5. On 10 June 2008, Yabeh and Ali's unit was surprised by the Eritrean assault: 7 of its members were captured, of whom 5 were wounded. The other five Djiboutian soldiers taken prisoner were:

1) PFC Mohamoud Hildid Sougueh[2]

2) PFC Djama Ahmed Abrar

3) PFC Osman Mahamoud Ahmed

4) PFC Ali Abdallah Lubak

5) PFC Cheiko Borito Ali

6. The group was immediately transferred to Rahayta, whey they spent the night. The Eritrean military commander at Rahayta was nicknamed "Wedi Haile". The

[1] Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et de la Cooperation Internationale, "Lourdes Pertes Subies par l'Armee Djiboutiennes", juillet 2010 (See Annex 4.1.a. and 4.1.b.).

[2] PFC stands for Private First Class.

Djiboutian believed him to be from military intelligence and the chief of security for Assab zone. They described him as short, fat and balding in his late-40s.

Assab

7. The following day the prisoners were transferred to Assab, where they were held in a military camp near the port. Through the window of their cell they could see a radar terminal and hear the sound of waves. The injured prisoners had their wounds cleaned and dressed, but bullets and shrapnel were not removed. They received a meal of injera (flat bread). That night, under interrogation, was the first and only times in Eritrean custody to which they were subjected to physical abuse (see Annex 4.1.c. for the suspected location of the camp).

8. The Assab detention centre was guarded by a unit of approximately 20 men who watched the prisoners in 2-3 man shifts. The unit commander was an Sergeant named Mohamed who spoke the Afar language and could therefore communicate with some of the Djiboutian soldiers directly. Wedi Haile used to visit from time to time, communicating through Sergeant Mohamed.

Asmara

9. After 1 month and 20 days in Assab, the POWs were driven in the back of a Toyota pick-up truck to Asmara, where they were detained in another military facility. All the prisoners were keep in one barracks-like structure with a guard outside. They could communicate with a group of Ethiopian civilian detainees held in a neighbouring compound, separated only by a fence. The Djiboutians remained in Asmara for only three days.

Af'abet/Shabay-Mandar

10. From Asmara the POWs were driven to in a covered truck to Shabay-Mandar, a training camp for Ethiopian armed opposition groups. The prisoners were held across a dirt track from the training school at another, disused military camp. Although there were other prisoners at the camp — mainly members of Eritrean opposition groups — the Djiboutians were generally kept apart from them (see Annex 4.1.d. for an aerial view of the facility).

11. The commander of Shabay-Mandar training school, a colonel nicknamed "Wedi Mooye", also supervised the prison. The prison commander was Second Lieutenant Fekare. At one point in 2010, Wedi Haile from Assab was brought to the jail as a prisoner for three months. We didn't speak to him, because we were kept isolated from other prisoners, but we heard we was there and could see him.

12. Although they were not abused at the prison, the diet was poor and all seven suffered malnutrition. Bouts of severe diarrhoea and other diseases were common, but the prisoners received medical care only if they were too sick to stand The five wounded POWs received no medical attention for their injuries, which grew progressively worse. According to Yabeh and Ali, two prisoners, Osman Mohamoud Ahmed and Mohamoud Hildid Sougueh, went blind. Djama Ahmed Abrar, who had been shot in the shoulder, lost the use of his arm.

Escape

13. Five of the POWS had never fully recovered from their injuries and became so sick and weak that escape was not possible. They therefore agreed that if escape became possible, only Yabeh and Ali would make the attempt, in order to bring news to their families and the Djiboutian authorities.

14. On 5 September 2011, an opportunity to escape presented itself when the prison guards permitted the Djiboutians to sleep outside because of exceptionally hot weather. With only one guard on watch, Yabeh and Ali were able to slip away under cover of darkness and crawl under the eastern perimeter of chain link fence.

15. The two POWs walked for 11 days in the direction of Sudan, telling any Eritreans they met that they were Somalis who had fled troubles at home. They found many people to be sympathetic, offering them water and advising them how to avoid the security forces on their way to the border.

16. On 16 September 2011, they arrived at Karuurah, where they placed themselves in Sudanese custody, and were repatriated to Djibouti.

Annex 4.1.a
Information files of escaped Djiboutian prisoners of war

REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE
ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES ARMEES

FICHE DE RENSEIGNEMENT

- **NOM** : KADIR SOUMBOUL ALI **MLE** : 02/2098/T
- **GRADE** : CAL **CORPS** : 1°RAR
- **DATE DE NAISSANCE** : 1975 **LIEU** : YOBOKI
- **DATE ENTREE EN SERVICE** : 01/01/02
- **DATE DE NOMINATION** : 01/06/09
- **CIN N°** : 123319 ..... **DELIVREE LE** ...1997
- **NOM DE LA MERE** : FATOUMA ABAKARI
- **ADRESSE** : CITE DOUMEIRA
- **SITUATION FAMILLE** : MARIE
- **NOM DE L'EPOUSE** : LAGAHO MOHAMED ABDO **NBRE D'ENFANTS** : 00
- **PERSONNE A PREVENIR** : FORCES ARMEES DJIBOUTIENNES

REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE
ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES ARMEES

FICHE DE RENSEIGNEMENT

- **NOM** : AHMED ELEYEH YABEH **MLE** : 02/0665/T
- **GRADE** : CAL **CORPS** : 1°RAR
- **DATE DE NAISSANCE** : 20/02/1971 **LIEU** : OUBOULEY
- **DATE ENTREE EN SERVICE** : 01/01/02
- **DATE DE NOMINATION** : 01/06/09
- **CIN N°** : 102619..... **DELIVREE LE** ...1996
- **NOM DE LA MERE** : ROHO YABEH
- **ADRESSE** : BALBALA, Q.5
- **SITUATION FAMILLE** : MARIE
- **NOM DE L'EPOUSE** : SAADA MOHAMED KAMIL **NBRE D'ENFANTS** : 03
- **PERSONNE A PREVENIR** : FORCES ARMEES DJIBOUTIENNES

1/

Annex 4.1.b
Information files of Djiboutian military personnel missing in action

REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE
ETAT MAJOR DES FORCES ARMEES

FICHE DE RENSEIGNEMENT

- **NOM** : ALI ABDALLAH LOUBAK **MLE** : 02/1479/T
- **GRADE** : CAL **CORPS** : 1°RAR
- **DATE DE NAISSANCE** : 1968 **LIEU** : HANIEH
- **DATE ENTREE EN SERVICE** : 01/01/02
- **DATE DE NOMINATION** : 01/06/09
- **CIN N°** : 133599..... **DELIVREE LE** ...1999
- **NOM DE LA MERE** : HASNA ALI
- **ADRESSE** : CITE DOUMEIRA
- **SITUATION FAMILLE** : MARIE
- **NOM DE L'EPOUSE** : NEIMA MOHAMED AHMED **NBRE D'ENFANTS** : 00
- **PERSONNE A PREVENIR** : FORCES ARMEES DJIBOUTIENNES

4 . 1

REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE
ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES ARMEES

FICHE DE RENSEIGNEMENT

- **NOM** : OSMAN MOHAMOUD AHMED **MLE** : 02/0859/T
- **GRADE** : CAL **CORPS** : 1°RAR
- **DATE DE NAISSANCE** : 1964 **LIEU** : DIKHIL
- **DATE ENTREE EN SERVICE** : 01/01/02
- **DATE DE NOMINATION** : 01/06/09
- **CIN N°** : 103932..... **DELIVREE LE** ...1993
- **NOM DE LA MERE** : SAIDA HERSI
- **ADRESSE** : CITE DOUMEIRA
- **SITUATION FAMILLE** : MARIE
- **NOM DE L'EPOUSE** : AMINA OMAR AMARREH **NBRE D'ENFANTS** : 00
- **PERSONNE A PREVENIR** : FORCES ARMEES DJIBOUTIENNES

REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE
ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES ARMEES

FICHE DE RENSEIGNEMENT

- **NOM** : CHEIKO BORITO ALI — **MLE** : 02/1233/T
- **GRADE** : CAL — **CORPS** : 1°RAR
- **DATE DE NAISSANCE** : 1967 — **LIEU** : HILLOU
- **DATE ENTREE EN SERVICE** : 01/01/02
- **DATE DE NOMINATION** : 01/06/09
- **CIN N°** : 052346..... **DELIVREE LE** ...1968
- **NOM DE LA MERE** : AHADI SEIKO
- **ADRESSE** : CITE DOUMEIRA
- **SITUATION FAMILLE** : MARIE
- **NOM DE L'EPOUSE** : / — **NBRE D'ENFANTS** : 01
- **PERSONNE A PREVENIR** : FORCES ARMEES DJIBOUTIENNES

REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE
ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES ARMEES

FICHE DE RENSEIGNEMENT

- **NOM** : MOHAMOUD HILDID SOUGUEH **MLE** : 02/0725/T
- **GRADE** : CAL **CORPS** : 1°RAR
- **DATE DE NAISSANCE** : 1971 **LIEU** : SANKAL
- **DATE ENTREE EN SERVICE** : 01/01/02
- **DATE DE NOMINATION** : 01/06/09
- **CIN N°** : 082349..... **DELIVREE LE** ...1990
- **NOM DE LA MERE** : GOUMAN HERSI
- **ADRESSE** : CITE DOUMEIRA
- **SITUATION FAMILLE** : MARIE
- **NOM DE L'EPOUSE** : OUBAH YOUSSOUF ABDI **NBRE D'ENFANTS** : 00
- **PERSONNE A PREVENIR** : FORCES ARMEES DJIBOUTIENNES

REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE
ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES ARMEES

FICHE DE RENSEIGNEMENT

- **NOM** : DJAMA AHMED ABRAR **MLE** : 02/0879/T
- **GRADE** : CAL **CORPS** : 1°RAR
- **DATE DE NAISSANCE** : 1972 **LIEU** : DIKHIL
- **DATE ENTREE EN SERVICE** : 01/01/02
- **DATE DE NOMINATION** : 01/06/09
- **CIN N°** : 103998..... **DELIVREE LE** ...1990
- **NOM DE LA MERE** : HAWA HACHI
- **ADRESSE** : CITE DOUMEIRA
- **SITUATION FAMILLE** : MARIE
- **NOM DE L'EPOUSE** : MALYOUN HAROUR GARANDI **NBRE D'ENFANTS** : 00
- **PERSONNE A PREVENIR** : FORCES ARMEES DJIBOUTIENNES

Annex 4.1.c
Aerial view of suspected Assab holding facilities (23 December 2007)



Annex 4.1.d
Aerial view of Shabay-Mandar training camp and adjacent prison facility (17 March 2007)




Escape Route
Troop barracks
Main gate
Military HQs/admin buildings
PoWs day quarter
PoWs night quarter – structure erected in 2008

United Nations S/2012/546

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 July 2012

Original: English

Letter dated 13 July 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1972 (2011), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Emergency Relief Coordinator on the implementation of paragraphs 3 and 4 of that resolution and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia (see annex).

I would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) H. S. **Puri**
Chairman
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea

12-42776 (E) 200712

Please recycle

Annex

Letter dated 2 July 2012 from the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea

In accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1972 (2011), I have the honour to transmit the requested report on the implementation of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia (see enclosure).

The humanitarian community working in Somalia wishes to advise that, as in the four previous reports, it maintains the definition of the term "implementing partner" pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1916 (2010), which is as follows:

> "Implementing partner", a non-governmental organization or community-based organization that has undergone due diligence to establish its bona fides by a United Nations agency or another non-governmental organization, and that reports when requested to the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia on mitigation measures. Implementing partners have the following characteristics:
>
> (a) The organization is part of the consolidated appeals process for Somalia (or the common humanitarian fund process);
>
> (b) The organization is represented in a cluster's 3W matrix (*Who* does *What* and *Where*).

I remain available should you have any questions about the content of the report or need further clarification on the humanitarian situation in Somalia.

(*Signed*) Valerie **Amos**
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
and Emergency Relief Coordinator

Enclosure

Report of the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia

Introduction

1. The present report is the fifth submission pursuant to Security Council resolution 1972 (2011), the successor resolution to resolution 1916 (2010). In paragraph 5 of resolution 1972 (2011), the Council requested the Emergency Relief Coordinator to report to the Security Council by 15 July 2012 on the implementation of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, through the support of United Nations agencies and organizations having observer status in the General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance.

2. The present report covers the period from November 2011 to June 2012. It focuses primarily on the regions of Somalia under the control of Al-Shabaab, which was listed, pursuant to paragraph 8 of Council resolution 1844 (2008), by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, on 12 April 2010.

3. As in the four previous reports (S/2010/372, S/2010/580, S/2011/125 and S/2011/694), the present report outlines constraints to humanitarian access and their operational implications, as well as the mitigation measures that have been put in place to address the politicization, misuse and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance.

4. During the reporting period, the security environment in southern and central Somalia remained volatile, with brief but violent clashes taking place between a number of actors, including Transitional Federal Government troops, the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, the Kenya Defence Forces, Ahl al-Sunna wal Jama'a, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Al-Shabaab. Central and southern Somalia also remained the epicentre of the humanitarian crisis. Humanitarian access remained difficult owing to generalized insecurity, the direct limitations on humanitarian action imposed by Al-Shabaab and the operating constraints faced in providing assistance in settlements of internally displaced persons, particularly in Mogadishu. Humanitarian organizations have sought different operational modalities in an effort to balance risks and the ability to continue to deliver to people in need. Significant progress has also been made with regard to the overall risk management framework in Somalia.

Constraints on humanitarian access and their operational implications

5. Compared with the previous reporting period, there has been a significant improvement in the humanitarian situation throughout Somalia. Areas affected by famine conditions decreased from six to three in mid-November 2011. By February 2012, famine conditions no longer prevailed in the country. This was largely a result of the effective delivery of aid and the exceptional harvest at the beginning of the year. The gains are still very fragile, however, and could easily be reversed without continued assistance. An estimated 2.51 million people are still in need of immediate humanitarian assistance, over 70 per cent of them in southern Somalia. An additional 1.3 million people are in need of livelihood support. Malnutrition and

mortality rates are still unacceptably high, with 320,000 children under 5 years of age acutely malnourished.

6. Humanitarian actors have been able to maintain the increased levels of presence and assistance reached in the fourth quarter of 2011. During the reporting period, roughly 1,070 national and international United Nations staff were in Somalia at any given time. According to the latest data, food assistance reached 2.2 million out of 2.5 million Somalis in need. Over a quarter of a million malnourished children were treated, and immunization programmes reached 1 million Somali children and women of childbearing age. Water, sanitation and hygiene partners reached more than 1.1 million people with sustained water interventions, 1.6 million people with temporary water programmes and 600,000 people with sanitation activities. Food and livelihood projects increased and reached more than 1 million Somalis, as the rebuilding of resilience was prioritized as a common humanitarian objective.

7. Conflict in southern and central Somalia continues to have a significant impact on the civilian population. From November 2011 to early June 2012, a total of 98,964 arrivals of internally displaced persons were reported in Mogadishu. In February 2012 alone, approximately 25,000 people were displaced by fighting between AMISOM/Transitional Federal Government forces and Al-Shabaab. There is a continuing inflow of population into Kenya. Exact numbers remain unconfirmed, however, as the registration of new arrivals in the Dadaab refugee camp has been suspended since the kidnapping of two international aid workers in mid-October 2011.

8. During the reporting period, Transitional Federal Government/AMISOM forces took control of several towns, including Afgooye, Baidoa, Beledweyne and Afmadow. At the time of writing, advances continue towards other Al-Shabaab strongholds, including Kismaayo. While the Transitional Federal Government has been able to establish itself in several key towns, control of these areas is very tenuous and does not, in general, extend beyond the urban perimeter. Al-Shabaab currently retains control of the areas surrounding these "garrison towns", from where it continues to engage in asymmetrical warfare.

9. In the areas no longer under Al-Shabaab control, the efforts of humanitarian organizations to increase presence and activities have proved difficult owing to the lack of clarity with regard to power holders, heightened insecurity and, in some cases, the logistical difficulties in maintaining supply routes. In November 2011, Al-Shabaab further restricted the number of organizations able to operate in areas under their control. Moreover, there continue to be reports of Al-Shabaab imposing taxes and seizing assets, targeting both humanitarian and private business actors.

10. In Mogadishu, the security situation has improved but remains highly volatile. Over the reporting period, Mogadishu saw regular attacks with hand grenades and improvised explosive devices (vehicle-borne and otherwise), as well as a significant increase in targeted threats and killings by Al-Shabaab. From November 2011 to May 2012, the World Health Organization recorded 3,345 civilian casualties being treated in the three main hospitals in Mogadishu. It is important to note, however, that this is approximately half the casualty rate of the previous reporting period.

11. Mogadishu has seen increased humanitarian and development activities on the part of various United Nations agencies, international non-governmental

organizations, organizations supported by Turkey and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. In their efforts to deliver aid, humanitarian organizations continue to face an array of impediments. District-level authorities, unregulated militia and representatives of clans and internally displaced persons continue to exert control over internally displaced populations, limiting or taxing their access to aid. A number of non-governmental organizations have reported attempts by different levels of authorities to control aid distribution, the typology of aid being delivered or the identification of target populations.

Risk mitigation measures

12. The risk of diversion of humanitarian aid remains a concern throughout Somalia. The humanitarian community has sought to address this by developing diverse programming modalities. Several organizations have opted for cash transfers and voucher schemes, which are a lower risk.

13. As mentioned in the previous report, the United Nations country team has formally established a Risk Management Unit comprising two staff and headed by a Risk Manager. The Risk Management Unit is a unique structure in the United Nations system that supports all agencies, funds and programmes working on Somalia (including humanitarian and development assistance) and helps to facilitate more effective, efficient and harmonized assistance to the people of Somalia.

14. The Risk Management Unit is actively involved in promoting enterprise risk management in Somalia, as well as throughout the wider United Nations system and with the international community. The Unit has completed a number of risk assessments and provided risk management support to the country team. These assessments have resulted in the identification of potential fraud and corruption and conflicts of interest and in the development of corporate risk profiles.

15. Since the previous report, the Risk Management Unit has established the Contractor Information Management System, a database that contains data from nine United Nations agencies; work is continuing to capture data from other entities of the United Nations country team. At the moment, the database holds information on 1,112 individual contractors and 1,850 contracts valued at more than $317.8 million. It is also able to capture information about board members and shareholders and to upload risk reports and the biographical details of individuals, including photographs.

16. A key milestone in the development of the database has been the introduction of a search tool that enables the user to search an entity or individual (original, including Arabic, script, primary name, secondary name, aliases) on all United Nations consolidated lists of designated persons and entities, including those subject to financial sanctions. This functionality, like the Risk Management Unit itself, is unique within the United Nations system and significantly enhances due diligence.

17. Further supporting due diligence efforts, the Risk Management Unit designed and completed the common minimum standards for due diligence. The standards have been provided to the country team and are particularly relevant for the cluster working groups. The standards recognize that traditional due diligence models tend to favour larger entities, as they are able to provide "acceptable" levels of information, such as bank accounts and evidence of internal audit mechanisms, which are more difficult for small and medium-sized entities to provide. This then

results in the latter entities being assessed as a greater risk and subsequently penalized.

18. The Risk Management Unit recently, has established a risk monitoring team, which will provide basic monitoring and surveillance activities in Mogadishu and will be in place in July 2012. Upon the request of United Nations entities, the team will provide assessments and progress reports of their aid delivery in Mogadishu, highlighting existing or potential problems to senior management. The intention is to expand this programme support to operations throughout Somalia.

19. The risk management team will also support wider monitoring and evaluation activities by producing six-monthly strategic reports that will entail an overall analysis of the monitoring activities, findings, observations and key issues relating to the implementation of projects and activities. The reports will assist the country team in managing interventions and identifying opportunities to collectively improve implementation.

20. The Risk Management Unit is also actively involved in promoting enterprise risk management throughout the wider United Nations system, as well as the international community, through training and direct support to donors, partners and other United Nations country teams. This is to ensure that international best practice is incorporated in the enterprise risk management implemented by the country teams and that lessons learned can be shared.

Impact of resolutions 1916 (2010) and 1972 (2011)

21. More than two years after the adoption of Security Council resolution 1916 (2010) and, later, resolution 1972 (2011), views on the impact of the resolutions on donor funding are relatively positive. As stated in previous reports to the Security Council, the general consensus seems to be that, although funding delays occurred initially, the resolutions have facilitated the provision of financial and material support to life-saving activities. Paragraph 4 of resolution 1972 (2011) provides for an exemption for a period of 16 months from the provisions of paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008); that exemption is due to expire in July 2012. The non-renewal of the humanitarian exemption might result in delays in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in areas controlled by non-State armed groups.

22. With respect to the impact of the resolutions on organizations operating in Somalia, the Humanitarian Coordinator for the country on behalf of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, surveyed organizations operating in Somalia on the mitigation measures that the humanitarian community had adopted. Organizations surveyed reported on the use of several mitigation measures, such as the comprehensive screening of staff, implementing partners and contractors.

23. Several organizations continue to operate outside the exemption regime. Drawing humanitarian organizations into the sanctions regime has been viewed by some as an erosion of the principles of neutrality and independence.

24. At the global level, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Norwegian Refugee Council have commissioned a study on the impact of national counter-terrorism measures on humanitarian action. The study will include a review of relevant national legislation criminalizing the provision of support to and engagement with designated entities, an analysis of provisions in funding agreements limiting or imposing conditions on humanitarian activities,

consideration of measures imposed by host States that preclude, limit or impose conditions on the engagement of humanitarian actors with or support for groups considered "terrorist", and a review of how different humanitarian actors have reacted to such measures.

Conclusion

25. Despite improvements, the situation in Somalia is still fragile, and a significant part of its population remains in need of humanitarian assistance. While risks associated with the delivery of humanitarian assistance remain high, risk management and mitigation measures have been significantly strengthened. Agencies are now able to quickly adapt to minimize the possible misuse or misappropriation of humanitarian assistance. Comprehensive due diligence processes are in place, and efforts to strengthen monitoring and evaluation systems are ongoing.

26. As a result of higher levels of accountability and the implementation of due diligence measures, the Security Council is invited to consider the cessation of the present reporting requirement.